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 1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to develop an early‐warning system (EWS) for identifying 
systemic banking risk, which will give policymakers and supervisors time to prevent or mitigate a 
potential financial crisis. It is important to forecast—and perhaps to alleviate—the pressures that 
lead to systemic crises, which are economically and socially costly and which require significant 
time to reverse (Honohan et al., 2003). The current U.S. supervisory policy toolkit includes 
several EWSs for flagging distress in individual institutions, but it lacks a tool for identifying 
systemic-level banking distress.
1 
Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010) review the theoretical foundations of EWSs for 
systemic banking risk and classify the explanatory variables that appear in the systemic-risk 
EWS literature (see Table 1). EWS precedents typically seek the best model for the set of 
relationships that describe the interaction of the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables. The theoretical precedents
2 typically examine the emergence of systemic risk from 
aggregated economic imbalances, which sometimes result in corrective shocks. The prevalent 
view
3 is that systemic financial risk is the possibility that a shock event triggers an adverse 








1  Examples of current U.S. supervisory early warning systems include Canary (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency) and SR-SABR (Federal Reserve Board, 2005), which are designed to 
identify banks in an early stage of capital distress. An overview of EWSs for micro risk is presented 
by Gaytán and Johnson (2002, pp. 21–36), and King, Nuxoll, and Yeager (2006, pp. 58–65). Jagtiani 
et al. (2003) empirically test the validity of three supervisory micro-risk EWSs (SCOR, SEER, and 
Canary). 
2  See particularly Borio et al. (1994); Borio and Lowe (2002, Asset; and 2002, Crises); and Borio and 
Drehmann (2009). 
3  Group of Ten (2001). 5 
 
capital and serve intermediary functions, thereby generating spillover effects into the real 
economy with no clear self‐healing mechanism. 
Illing and Liu (2003, 2006) express the useful consensus theory that the financial system’s 
exposure generally derives from deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and, more precisely, 
from diverging developments in the real economic and financial sectors, shocks within the 
financial system, banks’ idiosyncratic risks, and contagion among institutions. Thus, systemic 
risk is 
  initiated by primary risk factors and 
  propagated by markets’ structural characteristics.
4 
Hanschel and Monnin (2005)
5 provide the most direct theoretical and methodological 
precedent for the present study by using a regression approach to estimate a model that regresses 
a systemic stress index on the k observed standardized past imbalances
6 of explanatory variables. 
In their study, only one “optimal” lag is chosen for each of the explanatory variables, which are 
constructed as standardized imbalances equal to the distance between a level and the mean value 
of the respective variables up to time t divided by the standard deviation of time t. This approach 
implies an assumption that the trend serves as a “proxy for the longer-term fundamental value of 
a variable, around which the actual series fluctuates” (Hanschel et al., 2005). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
                                                            
4  Illing and Liu (2006, p. 244) postulate that financial stress “is the product of a vulnerable structure 
and some exogenous shock.” 
5  Construction of a continuous index is well described in Illing and Liu (2006, pp. 250–256); and 
Hanschel and Monnin (2005, pp. 432–438). 
6  Hanschel and Monnin, following the tradition established by Borio et al., call these imbalances 
“gaps.” 6 
 
Gramlich et al. (2010) review the limitations of existing approaches to EWSs when applied 
to systemic risk, stating that “microprudential EWS models cannot, because of their design, 
provide a systemic perspective on distress; for the same reason, macroprudential EWS models 
cannot provide a distress warning from individual institutions that are systemically important or 
from the system’s organizational pattern.” The authors argue that the architecture of the systemic 
risk EWS “can overcome the fundamental limitations of traditional models, both micro and 
macro” and “should combine both these classes of existing supervisory models.” Recent 
systemic financial crises show that propagation mechanisms include structural and feedback 
features. Thus, the proposed supervisory EWS for systemic risk incorporates both 
microprudential and macroprudential perspectives, as well as the structural characteristics of the 
financial system and a feedback-amplification mechanism. 
The dependent variable for the SAFE EWS proposed here
7 is developed separately as a 
financial stress index.
8 The models in the SAFE EWS explain the stress index using data from 
the five largest U.S. bank holding companies, regressing institutional imbalances using an 
optimal lag method. The z‐scores of institutional data are justified as explanatory imbalances. 
The models utilize both public and proprietary supervisory data. The paper discusses how to use 
the EWS and tests to see if supervisory data helps; it also investigates and suggests levels for 
action thresholds appropriate for this EWS. 
To simulate the models, we select not only the explanatory variables but also the optimal 
lags, building on and extending precedent ideas from the literature with our own innovations. 
Most of the earlier lag selection research emphasizes the important criteria of goodness of fit, 
variables’ statistical significance (t-statistics), causality, etc. Hanssens and Liu (1983) present 
                                                            
7  Collectively, the set of models is considered to form a supervisory EWS framework called SAFE 
(Systemic Assessment of Financial Environment). 
8  Oet et al. (2009, 2011). 7 
 
methods for the preliminary specification of distributed lags in structural models in the absence 
of theory or information. Davies (1977) selects optimal lags by first including all possible 
variable lags, chosen on the basis of theoretical considerations; he further narrows the lag 
selection by best results in terms of t-statistics and R
2. Holmes and Hutton (1992) and Lee and 
Yang (2006) introduce techniques for selecting optimal lags by considering causality. Bahmani-
Oskooee and Brooks (2003) demonstrate that when goodness of fit is used as a criterion for the 
choice of lag length and the cointegrating vector, the sign and size of the estimated coefficients 
are in line with theoretical expectations. The lag structure in the VAR models described by 
Jacobson (1995) is based on tests of residual autocorrelation; Winker (2000) uses information 
criteria, such as AIC and BIC. Murray and Papell (2001) use a lag length kj selection method for 
single-equation models: they start with an upper bound kmax on k. If the t-statistic on the 
coefficient of the last lag is significant at 10 percent of the value of the asymptotic distribution 
(1.645), then kmax = k. If it is not significant, then k is lowered by one. This procedure is repeated 
until the last lag becomes significant. 
Recent research focuses on automatic procedures for optimal lag selection. Dueck and 
Scheuer (1990) apply a heuristic global optimization algorithm in the context of an automatic 
selection procedure for the multivariate lag structure of a VAR model. Winker (1995, 2000) 
develops an automatic lag selection method as a discrete optimization problem. Maringer and 
Winker (2005) propose a method for automatic identification of the dynamic part of VEC models 
of economic and financial time series and also address the non-stationary issues. They employ 
the modified information criterion discussed by Chao and Phillips (1999) for the case of partially 
non-stationary VAR models. In addition, they allow for “holes” in the lag structures, that is, lag 
structures are not constrained to sequences up to lag k, but might consist, for example, of only 8 
 
the first and fourth lag in an application to quarterly data. Using this approach, different lag 
structures can be used for different variables and in different equations of the system. Borbély 
and Meier (2003) argue that estimated forecast intervals should account for the uncertainty 
arising from specifying an empirical forecasting model from the sample data. To allow this 
uncertainty to be considered systematically, they formalize a model selection procedure that 
specifies a model’s lag structure and accounts for aberrant observations. The procedure can be 
used to bootstrap the complete model selection process when estimating forecast intervals. 
Sharp, Jeffress, and Finnigan (2003) introduce a program that eliminates many of the difficulties 
associated with lag selection for multiple predictor variables in the face of uncertainty. The 
procedure 1) lags the predictor variables over a user-defined range; 2) runs regressions for all 
possible lag permutations in the predictors; and 3) allows users to restrict results according to 
user-defined selection criteria (for example, “face validity,” significant t-tests, R
2, etc.). Lag-o-
Matic output generally contains a list of models from which the researcher can make quick 
comparisons and choices. 
The SAFE EWS models are based on high-quality data. The dependent data is high 
frequency, with over 5,000 daily observations, leading to the construction of a quarterly 
dependent variable series. Most dependent data is sourced from Bloomberg and the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED), supplemented by the Bank of England. The explanatory data 
comes from 77 quarterly panels from Q1:1991 to Q3:2010. We consider the 20 bank holding 
companies that were historically in the highest tier and aggregate the top five of them as a proxy 
for a group of systemically important institutions. We specify the model using 50 in‐sample 
quarters. A large component of this data comes from public sources, mostly from the Federal 
Reserve System (FRS) microdata for bank holding companies and their bank subsidiaries. The 9 
 
public FRS data is supplemented by additional high-quality sources that are accessible to the 
public, such as S&P/Case Shiller
9 and MIT Real Estate Center (for the return data), Compustat 
databases (for some structural data), and Moody’s KMV (for some risk data). We also replicate 
data from some publicly available models and datasets, for example, the CoVaR model
10 and the 
Flow of Funds data. In addition, for each of the four classes of explanatory imbalances, we 
depend partly on private supervisory data. Our private dataset consists of data that is not 
disclosed to the public or the results of proprietary models developed at the Federal Reserve. 
Examples of private datasets are the cross‐ country exposures data and supervisory surveillance 
models, as well as several sub‐models developed specifically for this EWS.
11 Additional data 
descriptions are provided in Appendix A. Data sources for the explanatory variables are shown 
in Appendix C (Table 15).
12 The definitions, theoretical expectations, and Granger causality of 
the explanatory variables are summarized in Tables 16–19 (Appendix C). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual 
organization of elements of the systemic banking risk EWS. Section 3 discusses the methodology 
of the SAFE EWS models and their results. Section 4 discusses the research implications and 
case studies based on our models. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of interpretations and 
directions for future research. 
2. EWS elements 
The elements of an EWS are defined by a measure of financial stress, drivers of risk, and a 
risk model that combines both. As a measure of stress, the SAFE EWS uses the financial 
                                                            
9   Standard & Poor’s (2009). 
10   Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). 
11   The liquidity feedback model and the stress haircut model. 
12   To conserve space, the tables show only information for the explanatory variables that ultimately 
enter the SAFE model. 10 
 
markets’ stress series by Oet et al. (2009, 2011). The present paper contributes a new typology 
for the drivers of risk in the EWS; its risk model applies a regression approach to explain the 
financial markets’ stress index using optimally lagged institutional data. 
Our basic conjectures are that systemic financial stress can be induced by asset imbalances 
and structural weakness. We can view imbalances as the deviations between asset expectations 
and their fundamentals. The larger the deviation, the greater is the potential shock (see Fig. 1). 
Therefore, systemic financial stress can be expected to increase with the rise in imbalances. 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
 
Our second conjecture is that structural weakness in the financial system at a particular point 
in time increases systemic financial stress. As an illustration, consider a financial system as a 
network of financial intermediaries. This system is characterized by an absence of concentrations 
and a high degree of diversification. Individual institutions are interconnected with multiple 
counterparties of varying sizes across the system. This system’s entities are of varying sizes, 
some quite large and significant, some intermediate, and some small. The failure of one 
institution, even a large one, will sever a chain of connections and create local stress. This failure, 
however, has limited potential to induce systemic stress because of the great number of network 
redundancies and counterparties that can take up this stress. Such a system has an inherently 
strong balancing ability. 
By comparison, consider a financial system in which individual institutions are concentrated 
in particular markets and are interconnected in limited ways through a small number of 
intermediaries. In this system, certain financial intermediaries act as highly-interconnected 
gatekeepers that dominate particular markets (institutional groups). Market access for less-11 
 
connected institutions is only possible through these few significant gatekeeper institutions. As 
in the previous example, this system is also characterized by institutions of varying size. In the 
present example, however, a limited number of institutions dominate particular markets; some 
are interlinked with the entire network. The number of structural redundancies in this system is 
smaller, perhaps minimal in some markets. A failure or high-stress experience by one of the 
more dominant institutions in a particular market cannot be as easily sustained and therefore 
increases the potential for systemic risk. The failure of one of the gatekeeper institutions that 
interlink several markets can be catastrophic and may lead to the collapse of a market or even of 
the system. Therefore, this system is less tolerant of stress and failure on the part of a single 
significant market player. 
The conjecture of the importance of structural characteristics is supported by empirical 
evidence, which is discussed in Gramlich and Oet (2011). Briefly, U.S. banks’ loan exposures 
form a highly heterogeneous structure with distinct tiers. The structural heterogeneity is clearly 
observed in loan-type exposure (Fig. 2) and financial markets’ concentrations in the top five 
U.S. bank holding companies (Fig. 3). 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
 
2.1. Measuring financial stress — dependent variable data 
Building on the research precedent of Illing and Liu (2003, 2006), Oet et al. (2009, 2011) 
define systemic risk as a condition in which the observed movements of financial market 12 
 
components reach certain thresholds and persist. They develop the financial stress index in the 
U.S. (CFSI)
13 as a continuous index constructed of daily public market data. To ensure that a 
versatile index of stress has been identified, the researcher aims to represent a spectrum of 
markets from which stress may originate. As previous research in this field attests, the condition 
of credit, foreign exchange, equity, and interbank markets provides substantial coverage of 
potential stress origination. The CFSI uses a dynamic weighting method and daily data from the 
following 11 components: 1) financial beta, 2) bank bond spread, 3) interbank liquidity spread, 
4) interbank cost of borrowing, 5) weighted dollar crashes, 6) covered interest spread, 7) 
corporate bond spread, 8) liquidity spread, 9) commercial paper–T-bill spread, 10) Treasury 
yield curve spread, and 11) stock market crashes. The data is from Bloomberg and the Federal 
Reserve FRED database.
14 
It is important to note that in 2008, when the SAFE EWS was developed, no public series of 
financial stress in the United States existed. By 2010, however, 12 alternative financial stress 
indexes were available. The comparison of CFSI with alternative financial stress series is 
discussed in Oet et al. (2009, 2011).
15 
The financial stress series     in the SAFE EWS is constructed separately as        , a 
quarterly financial-markets stress index. Mathematically, the financial stress series is constructed 
as 
      ≝           ≞ ∑      ∗	            
  
 ∞     ∗ 100  (1) 
Here, each of j components of the index is observable in the markets with high (daily) frequency, 
but results in a quarterly series of financial stress in which     is the observed value of market 
                                                            
13  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Financial Stress Index. 
14   See Oet et al. (2011) for a description of specific CSFI data sources. 
15   Oet and Eiben (2009) discuss the initial CFSI construction. Oet et al. (2011) include comparisons 
with alternative indexes. 13 
 
component j at time t. The function        is the probability density function that the observed 
value will lie between     and	           . The integral expression             
  
 ∞  is the 
cumulative distribution function of the component     given as a summation of the probability 
density function from the lowest observed value in the domain of market component j to	  . This 
function describes the precedent set by the component’s value and how much that precedent 
matters. The     term is the weight given to indicator j in the        at time t. The key technical 
challenge in constructing and validating the financial stress series is the choice of weighting 
methodology. An inefficient choice would increase the series’ potential for giving false alarms. 
Seeking to minimize false alarms, we were agnostic as to the choice of weighting technique and 
tested a number of methods, including principal component analysis. The approach we ultimately 
selected to minimize false alarms is the credit weights method, which is explained in Oet et al. 
(2009, 2011). 
2.2. Drivers of risk — explanatory variables data 
To advance from these premises, we develop a methodology that uses z-scores to express 
imbalances. We define an imbalance    as a deviation of some explanatory variable    from its 
mean, constructing it as a standardized measure. That is, each   	explanatory variable is 
aggregated, deflated (typically by a price-based index), demeaned, and divided by its cumulative 
standard deviation at time t. The resulting z-score is designated	  . By construction,    describes 
imbalance as the distance in standard deviations from the mean of the    explanatory variable.    
imbalance shows potential for stress. The details of variable construction are summarized in 
Appendix B. 14 
 
The SAFE EWS builds on existing theoretical precedents, which are described in Table 1, 
using the new typology of systemic-risk EWS explanatory variables (see Table 2). The 
definitions, theoretical expectations, and Granger causality of the explanatory variables are 
summarized in Table 16-Table 19 (Appendix C). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
3. Risk model and results 
There are many ways to approach a model such as this. Generally, explanatory variables do 
not act at a single point in time but are, in fact, distributed in time. The estimation becomes 
particularly difficult when the number of observations is small relative to the number of 
variables. In preference to the distributed estimation, an optimal lag approach is used in practice. 
SAFE EWS consists of a number of models, each of which is an optimal lag-linear regression 
model of traditional form 
 
     	              ,                 ,                 ,                 ,            (2) 
where the dependent variable Yt  is constructed separately as a series of systemic stress in U.S. 
financial markets, and the independent variables   ,     are types of return, risk, liquidity,
16 and 
structural imbalances aggregated for the top five U.S. bank holding companies. 
3.1. EWS models 
Based on the premise that financial stress can be explained by imbalances in the system’s 
assets and structural features, what imbalance stories might be proposed? At the most basic level 
                                                            
16  Since we view imbalances as deviations from fundamental expectations, we choose to classify them 
further as return, risk, and liquidity imbalances. This classification is based on a typology of the 
demand for financial assets as a function of return, risk, and liquidity expectations (Mishkin 1992). 15 
 
and without any other information, one can expect financial stress at a point in time to be related 
to past stress. Indeed, a useful finding for model development was that the financial stress index 
(FSI) appeared to be an autoregressive process (AR), consisting of a single lag and a seasonal lag 
of the financial stress series itself. To this effect, the FSI’s underlying AR structure forms a 
benchmark model on which the researcher hopes to improve. Any model based on a credible 
imbalance story should outperform this naive benchmark model over time. The general strategy 
for constructing EWS models, then, would be to identify other explanatory variables that 
improve the FSI forecast over the benchmark. 
From a design perspective, a hazard inherent in all ex-ante models is that their uncertainty 
may lead to wrong policy choices. To mitigate this risk, SAFE develops two modeling 
perspectives: a set of long-lag (six quarters or more) forecasting specifications to give 
policymakers enough time for ex-ante policy action, and a set of short-lag forecasting 
specifications for verification and adjustment of supervisory actions. 
The two modeling perspectives have distinctly different functions and lead to different model 
forms. Short-lag models function dynamically, seeking to explain stress in terms of recent 
observations of it and of institutional imbalances that tend to produce stress relatively quickly 
and with a short lead. Long-lag models seek to explain the buildup of financial stress well in 
advance, in terms of institutional imbalances that tend to anticipate stress with a long lead. 
Because they focus on information lagged at least six quarters, the long-lag models cannot 
include the AR(1) and AR(4) benchmark components. The researcher must construct a 
reasonable set of variables to form a long-lag base model without the aid of a benchmark model. 
To proceed, we first establish parsimonious base models for the short- and long-lag horizons 
that outperform the naive benchmarking model and roughly explain financial stress in-sample. 16 
 
These base models tell the core imbalance story relevant to each time horizon. We then seek to 
establish specific EWS models that may tell additional stories of imbalances in risk, return, 
liquidity, and structure and further outperform the base models for each of the two forecasting 
horizons; these stories may differ across models. In the present study, we form eight 
specifications that represent a mix of explanatory variables for each horizon. Each model 
represents a different extension of the core story.
17 
3.1.1. A candidate base model 
We can proceed to a parsimonious, candidate base model by forming a core story composed 
of a set of imbalances that have a strong, consistent relationship with financial stress. 
Considering the institutional and structural data, which candidate variables possess the desirable 
explanatory powers? In fact, the series considered in Fig. 1 show four good candidates. Among 
the imbalances, one good candidate is equity, which we would expect to have a positive 
relationship with systemic financial stress. Among the risk imbalances, a strong hedging 
(negative) relationship should arise through imbalances in credit risk. On the liquidity side, an 
                                                            
17   The EWS design principles laid out in Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010) include flexibility 
under multiple horizons and stress scenarios. A regression‐based EWS is, at best, essentially a 
monitoring system highlighting important associations. Because no two crises are exactly alike, an 
EWS should be sensitive to a rich set of possible theoretical associations, rather than seeking an 
optimum fit using historic data. The reason for investigating a set of eight models is combinatory: 
There are four types of explanatory variables and two methods of imbalance construction: price‐based 
and total-assets based. However, the two present sets of eight models are revisions of the sets 
developed in the 2009 version of SAFE EWS. In its early development, the model population was the 
product of a more general iterative process that used a variety of regression-specification methods: 
forward regression, backward regression, stepwise regression, MAXR regression, and MINR 
regression. We found that backward regression did not lead to theoretically meaningful specifications; 
that the forward, MAXR, and MINR methods produced very similar, variable‐rich, theoretically 
meaningful specifications; and that a stepwise method produced concise, technically efficient, 
theoretically meaningful regressions. Accordingly, in the final selection stage for the 2009 version of 
SAFE, we applied only two specification methods (stepwise and MAXR) to four classes of models 
defined as follows: Class A models used constant-mean, price‐based imbalances; class B models used 
rolling-mean, price‐based imbalances; class C models used constant-mean, total-assets‐based 
imbalances; and class D models used rolling-mean, total-assets‐based imbalances. 17 
 
asset liability mismatch should exert a positive influence. And among the structural imbalances, 
leverage should provide a standard positive relationship. 
The logic for the sign expectations of these sample choices of candidate imbalances may go 
as follows: For return imbalances, equity for individual institutions acts as a buffer against 
potential credit losses but also increases downside risk. Considering the series’ z‐scores in real 
terms (that is, deflated by the CPI), the size of the change varies with the difference between the 
CPI and long‐term expectations for equity return. This reflects greater downside risk. Thus, an 
increase in real equity should be positively related to systemic financial stress. 
Among the risk imbalances, credit risk should be the standard negative variable. Measured as 
the distance between normal and stressed required credit capital, this imbalance reflects the 
hedging function of capital. The less the distance at a particular point in time, the greater the 
potential for systemic stress. Thus, an increase in this distance measure should relate negatively 
to systemic financial stress. 
Among liquidity imbalances, we expect that an asset liability mismatch will positively reflect 
greater systemic risk. Such a mismatch describes a simple gap difference between assets and 
liabilities in a particular maturity segment. Thus, an increased mismatch in itself indicates 
increased imbalance in repricing at a particular maturity and reflects increased exposure to 
interest-rate risk. Thus, the larger the mismatch, the larger the potential for systemic stress. 
Defined in the standard manner, leverage is the ratio of debt to equity. An institution that 
increases leverage takes on risky debt in order to increase gains on its inherent equity position. 
Thus leverage, as a magnifier of returns, increases both potential gains and potential losses. 
Greater leverage means higher levels of risky debt relative to safer equity; it is widely thought to 
fuel many financial crises. Thus, our theoretical expectation for leverage is positive. 18 
 
3.1.2. Short- and long-lag base models 
Clearly, the candidate base model described above is only one of the possible parsimonious 
models and is formed without particular consideration of the variable lag structure. A more 
rigorous procedure for forming short- and long-lag models is as follows: To help identify a set of 
key variables for constructing a base model, we first utilize Granger causality to find the set of 
variables whose Granger lags are appropriate for each modeling perspective, that is, exclusively 
from lag 6 to lag 12 for long-lag models, and inclusively from lag 1 to lag 12 for short-lag 
models. We then examine the correlations for all our variables and separate those that show a 
considerable correlation (more than 60 percent). For each group of potential variables with 
Granger lags, we use stepwise and max-R-square procedures to simulate the base models and to 
identify the key impact variables, high-rate-of-occurrence variables, and variables with large 
coefficients and high explanatory power. Finally, in each potential base model, we select the key 
variables using Granger lags from each category of return, liquidity, structure, and risk 
imbalance. If any key variable loses significance after it is entered into the base model,
18 we 
reiterate the variable’s optimal lag to get the desired significance and expected sign. Because we 
intend to test the models on an out-of-sample period that includes the financial crisis of 2007, we 
examine only the relationship between the FSI and our X’s through the first quarter of 2007. 
3.2. Criteria for variable and lag selection 
Starting from the short- and long-lag base models, we form additional short- and long-lag 
EWS models by extending the base models with other explanatory variables. We use the criteria 
below to determine whether a new variable should be included. 
                                                            
18   For example, as a result of variable multicollinearity and “holes” in the lag structure. 19 
 
1)  Theoretical review: Consider whether including the variable in the equation is 
unambiguous and theoretically sound. All variables in the model should meet the expected sign 
(see Appendix C, Table 16–Table 19 for theoretical sign). 
2)  Hypothesis testing (t-statistics): Consider whether the coefficient of the variable to be 
included is significant in the expected direction. We generally accept variables that are 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level. To avoid the heteroskedasticity problem, we report 
t-statistics in the variable and lag selection procedure. 
3)  Stationarity: Consideration of stationarity is important for time series data. We conduct 
stationarity tests for the entire model and each variable. The individual series’ stationary quality 
is verified using augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests. If the dependent variable is 
found to be nonstationary, we check for cointegration before making further adjustments. 
Cointegration of the trial OLS specifications is verified by running ADF unit root tests on the 
residuals. The tests show that the null hypothesis of unit root in the residuals is strongly rejected 
in all three random-walk cases: random walk (RW1), random walk with drift (RW2), and 
random walk with drift and trend (RW3). The reason is that ADF test statistics in each case are 
more critical than the test critical values, even at the 1 percent level. For nonstationary variables, 
we apply first differencing and re-verify the above criteria. 
4)  Granger causality: Consider whether the variable to be included changes consistently and 
predictably before the dependent variable. A variable that Granger causes financial stress one 
way at 20 percent significance can be retained for further testing. Thus far, we seek to retain the 
variables with significant Granger lags, expected signs, and significant coefficients. However, if 
the variable coefficient loses significance or changes sign when it is included in the model, we 20 
 
reiterate the variable’s optimal lag, seeking to re-establish all three criteria: theoretical 
expectation, significant coefficient, and Granger causality. 
5)  Multicollinearity: Although multicollinearity is not a serious forecasting issue, to ensure 
that our t-statistics are not inflated and to improve model stability over time, we try to minimize 
potential multicollinearity issues by considering the variance inflation factor (VIF). We seek to 
replace the variables with VIFs higher than 10. 
6)  Optimal lag selection: We utilize SAS for automatic lag selection and model simulation. 
Starting from the base models, we enter new candidate variables that pass the above tests, one at 
a time, from the return, risk, liquidity, and structure imbalance classes. For each new variable, 
we test and select the optimal lag among variable lags from one to twelve inclusive for short-lag 
and from six to twelve inclusive for long-lag models. The optimality criteria include sign 
expectations, t-statistics, Granger causality, VIF, R
2, and number of observations.
19 If none of the 
lags for a variable show significance in the theoretically expected direction, we exclude the 
variable from the model. If more than one lag meets our selection requirements, we narrow the 
selection of the optimal lag to the one with Granger causality and the most adjusted R
2 increases. 
In summary, the variables listed in the Granger causality tables form the principal regressors in 
the EWS models (see Appendix C, Table 16–Table 19). The variables with Granger lags that are 
significant at the 10 percent level are considered first because they demonstrate a stronger 
Granger relationship with FSI than those that are significant at the 20 percent level. 
7)  Forecasting accuracy review: Consider and compare forecasting metrics. When the 
variable is added to the equation, 
o  does adjusted 	      increase? 
                                                            
19   The innovation of our optimal-lag selection procedure consists of including Granger causality and 
multicollinearity criteria. In addition, the number of observations serves as an operational threshold: 
Variables with less than 50 in-sample observations are rejected. 21 
 
o  does MAPE decrease? 
o  does RMSE decrease? 
o  do the information criteria (AIC and SC) decrease? 
o  does Theil U decrease? 
8)  Review of bias: Do other variables’ coefficients change significantly when the variable is 
added to the equation? 
o  Functional form bias: This issue generally manifests itself in biased estimates, poor 
fit, and difficulties reconciling theoretical expectations with empirical results. For several 
variables in the model, the transformation from level relationship to changes in the 
independent variable is found to improve the functional form. 
o  Omitted variable bias: This bias typically results in significant signs of the regression 
variables that contradict theoretical expectations. When misspecification by omitted 
variables is detected in a trial model, we further adjust the model by seeking to include 
the omitted variable (or its proxy) or we replace the misspecified variables. 
o  Redundant variable: Typically, this issue results in “decreased precision in the form 
of higher standard errors and lower t‐scores.”
20 Irrelevant variables in the model generally 
fail most of the following criteria: theoretical expectations, lack of Granger causality, 
statistical insignificance, deteriorating forecasting performance (for example, RMSE, 
MAPE, and Theil U bias), and lack of additional explanatory power to determine the 
dependent variable (for example, R
2, AIC, and SC). When a strong theoretical case exists 
for including an independent variable that is not otherwise proxied by another related 
                                                            
20  Studenmund (2006), p. 394. 22 
 
variable, we try to find a proxy variable that is theoretically sound and is not redundant to 
the trial specification. 
9)  Robustness testing: To the extent that violations of classical linear regression model 
(CLRM) assumptions arise, certain adjustments in the model specification need to be made. 
o  Treatment of serial correlation: The results of the Breusch–Godfrey LM tests for 
short-lag dynamic models show evidence of serial correlation in three of the seven 
dynamic specifications (models 1, 5, and 8 in Table 6). Since all of these equations are in 
theory correctly specified, the serial correlation is pure and does not cause bias in the 
coefficients. Thus, we can apply Newey–West standard errors to these specifications 
while keeping the estimated coefficients intact. Durbin–Watson statistics of the long-lag 
models show inconclusive evidence of positive serial correlation, and many reject 
negative serial correlation at a 5 percent significance level for the estimation period of 
Q4:1991–Q1:2007. An expanded estimation period that includes the financial crisis 
(Q4:1991–Q4:2010) yields Durbin–Watson statistics that confirm serial correlation of the 
forecast errors. Adding AR, MA, or both terms as explanatory variables in these models 
can potentially remedy serial correlation. Models estimated with an autoregressive term 
as an explanatory variable successfully eliminate serial correlation for short-lag models. 
Since we aim to estimate models that have longer forecasting horizons without 
autoregressive variables, we include MA terms as explanatory variables to remove serial 
correlation and improve our forecasts. 
o  Heteroskedasticity: This can be an additional penalty associated with bad data and 
inherent measurement errors in the financial time series data. We conduct modified 
White and Breusch–Godfrey tests to ensure that the variance of the residual is constant 23 
 
(homoskedasticity CLRM assumption). The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in all cases, a welcome finding. 
o  Other specification problems: The Ramsey RESET (Regression Specification Error 
Test)
21 is commonly used as a general catch‐all test for misspecification that may be 
caused by the following: omitted variables, incorrect functional form, correlation between 
the residual and some explanatory variable, measurement error in some explanatory 
variable, simultaneity, and serial correlation. The very generality of the test makes it a 
useful bottom‐line check for any unrecognized misspecification errors. While the residual 
follows a multivariate normal distribution in a correctly specified OLS regression, 
Ramsey shows that the above conditions can lead to a nonzero mean vector of the 
residual. The Ramsey RESET test is set up as a version of a general-specification F‐test 
that determines the likelihood that some variable is omitted by measuring whether the fit 
of a given equation can be improved by adding some powers of	   . All the Ramsey 
RESET tests show welcome results, with a similar fit for the original and the respective 
test equation and the F‐statistic less than the critical F‐value. Provided no other 
specification problems are highlighted by earlier tests, Ramsey RESET tests further 
support the research claim that there are no specification problems. 
3.3. EWS model specifications and results 
In‐sample results of the benchmark (panel A), candidate base model (panel B), short-lag base 
model (panel C), and long-lag base model (panel D) are detailed in Table 3. In forming a base 
model, we seek a core story of theoretically consistent, long‐term relationships between systemic 
stress Yt and institutional imbalances Xt. The candidate model in panel B is formed by selecting 
                                                            
21   Ramsey (1969). 24 
 
representative imbalances, one per explanatory variable class, as discussed in the introduction. In 
this candidate model, real equity, asset‐liability mismatch, and leverage increase the potential for 
systemic stress, offset by credit risk imbalances. The candidate model in panel B improves on the 
benchmark model in-sample, as demonstrated by the adjusted coefficient of determination and 
the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. The short-lag base model in panel C is formed by 
establishing a core story that features positive influences of structural imbalances and negative 
influences of risk imbalances. The causes of increasing the potential for systemic stress 
(imbalances in FX concentration, leverage, and equity markets concentration) are offset by 
imbalances in interest-rate risk capital and credit risk distance to systemic stress. The short-lag 
base model further improves on the benchmark and candidate models. The long-lag base model 
shown in panel D is formed by modifying the core story for the longer run: positive influences of 
structural and risk imbalances and negative influences of risk and liquidity imbalances. 
Increasing the potential for systemic stress are imbalances in interbank concentration, leverage, 
and expected default frequency. They are offset by imbalances in fire-sale liquidity and credit 
risk distance to systemic stress. The long-lag base model provides a useful performance target 
for the long-lag EWS models. 
All of the base models’ variables are statistically significant in the expected direction and 
show significant Granger causality with the dependent financial stress series. Statistical 
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The significance of causal relationships at 20 percent and 10 percent is indicated 
by † and ††, respectively. The sample period is October 1991–March 2007. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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Out‐of‐sample results for the benchmark and base models are shown in Table 4. Viewed 
out‐of‐sample, the candidate base model fails to outperform the benchmarking model in root 
mean square error (RMSE) and bias (Theil U) measures, but offers modest improvement in mean 
absolute percentage error. The short-lag base model, however, consistently improves on the 
benchmarking model in all three statistical measures. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 summarizes the short-lag model stories that further improve on the core story of the 
corresponding base model in explaining financial stress in‐sample. Clearly, the positive and 
negative relationships with financial stress, color‐coded as they are, fit two stories—a positive 
story of structure and a negative story of risk
22—supplemented and enhanced by additional types 
of return and liquidity imbalances, both positive and negative.
23 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
For example, consider model 7 in Table 5. One can see that the core story, as in the other 
models, includes positive structure and negative risk influence. We supplement the story for this 
model by certain positive return imbalances and additional negative impact of risk imbalances, 
beyond those included in the core model. In model 7, the most significant variable for increasing 
the potential for systemic risk is the interest-rate risk distance to stress. This measure is related to 
the book value of equity that expresses the equity susceptibility to stress and is constructed 
through a proprietary stress-discounting model, so this is not an observable measure. The story of 
                                                            
22  The reason that risk imbalances describe a negative relationship with stress is that they are, by 
construction, predominantly defensive functions of capital and solvency. 
23   The long-lag models tell fundamentally similar stories of positive structural imbalances and negative 
risk imbalances. The corresponding table is omitted for brevity. 26 
 
susceptible equity is supplemented in this model by the story of total credit discounted by CPI, 
discussed above, and by the story of change in foreign-exchange concentrations. Decreasing the 
potential for systemic stress are the risk measures: solvency distance to systemic stress, credit 
risk distance to systemic stress, and the change in the credit risk distance to stress, all of them 
constructed for the SAFE EWS and not directly observable. 
In‐sample results of the eight competing EWS specifications for each forecasting horizon 
are detailed in the four‐part Table 6 (short-lag) and Table 7 (long-lag) below. Out‐of‐sample 
results are given in Table 8 (short-lag) and Table 9 (long-lag). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
4. Discussion and implications 
4.1. Performance 
4.1.1. Competitive performance of EWS models 
The stories told by the various short- and long-lag EWS models differ, so we expect that 
some will do better over time, while others are more suited to particular types of crises. In 27 
 
general, the stories might have different performance levels. It is instructive to look at the 
statistical performance of these models in-sample (Tables 6 and 7) and their out-of-sample 
forecasting ability (Tables 8 and 9). The forecasting parameters are defined through the window 
ending in 2010. Some interesting observations arise, such as that some models tend to be more 
stable than others over time. This is an important consideration, since financial conditions and 
regulatory regimes change, and products come and go. Therefore, it is important for the EWS 
researcher to seek a stable model or to recognize the dynamics and adjust accordingly. From this 
work, it appears that models 2, 4, and 7 may be expected to be stable and to possess attractive 
explanatory powers. 
We compare the relative performance of the eight short-lag specifications by running a 
forecasting horse race, in which we look at four known stress episodes: the LTCM crisis, the dot-
com crisis, the stock market downturn of 2002, and the subprime crisis. We then rank-order the 
models’ performance based on the RMSE (see Table 10). Some models consistently do better in 
this horse race, but others with less shining statistics also, somewhat surprisingly, provide 
powerful insights. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
It is tempting to think that one should seek “the winner,” but we would argue against this. It 
is very important for a policymaker using this EWS framework to resist the temptation to find 
the “best” model because no two crises are exactly alike! SAFE models represent distinct stories 
that most consistently explain financial stress in the markets. Future stress may evolve in ways 
never seen before or be driven by rare imbalance combinations that differ from the best historic 28 
 
model. To study a possible buildup of financial stress using this EWS, one should therefore 
consider a variety of plausible stories that may be realized over time. 
4.1.2. Case study 1: Supervisory versus public EWS specifications 
SAFE EWS incorporates both public and supervisory data. One assumption of the researcher 
is that non-public data provides a more accurate and actionable EWS. To test this assumption, 
we remove all supervisory FRS variables from the model suggestion stage
24 and re-specify 
SAFE models. 
There are three broad categories of explanatory data: 1) confidential, institution-specific data 
internal to the Federal Reserve System, 2) undisclosed Federal Reserve models and their output, 
and 3) data from the public domain. Category 1 consists of confidential institutional data not 
otherwise available to the public; category 2, which includes the undisclosed FRS models, may 
use either publicly available or Federal Reserve data. Category 3 comprises raw data from the 
public domain as well as output from publicly available models that utilize data from the public 
domain. We classify private supervisory data as FRS internal data (category 1) or the 
undisclosed output of FRS models (category 2). 
We expect to see a qualitative difference between category 1 and category 2 supervisory 
data. The confidential data (1), although opaque to the public, is generally of high quality. The 
constructed data (2) is prone to a number of measurement errors and is inherently much more 
unstable. Many of the public series from the original specifications are preserved. Removing 
private supervisory series most severely affects the risk variables and, to a lesser extent, the 
liquidity variables. Thus, we can expect those variables to be most affected when we take the 
private data out to see only the public formulations of the EWS models. Table 11 shows the 
                                                            
24   See Section 3.2. 29 
 
distribution of category 1 data (marked †) and category 2 data (marked ††) among the imbalance 
classes. Table 12 shows the proportion of supervisory variables among the specified independent 
variables. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
Insert Table 12 about here 
 
Comparing the public‐data-only versions of SAFE models with those using supervisory data 
(Table 13 and Fig. 4), we find that models using supervisory data outperform the public 
formulations in goodness of fit as well as forecasting ability, as seen in the RMSE, MAPE, and 
bias statistics. When applied to the out-of-sample 2007–09 period, both private and public 
specifications capture the increase in stress during Q2:2007. However, whereas two of the 
private models succeed in projecting explanations into Q4:2007, the public models completely 
fail to explain the latter episode. Thus, we find evidence of the importance and usefulness of 
private data in creating a systemic risk EWS. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
 
It is clear that even public-data-based, systemic risk EWS models would allow financial 
institutions to study the correlations and sensitivities of their exposure and structural positions 
within the financial system and to use the framework to enhance systemic-risk stress testing and 
scenario analysis. 
This case study considers only the relative out-of-sample performance of public and private 
SAFE models. Many interesting questions lie ahead in this line of investigation. For example, 30 
 
future work can address additional analytical questions, such as what factors mattered most in 
the recent crisis; what would be the results of likelihood tests for the three structural C’s 
(concentration, connectivity, contagion); and what results would be produced by likelihood tests 
for blocks of data triggered by behavioral effects. 
Insert Fig. 4 about here 
 
4.2. Applications to supervisory policy 
How can SAFE facilitate the work of policymakers? One of its key benefits is focusing their 
attention on imbalances that have strong positive and negative associations with financial stress. 
SAFE EWS models help explain financial market stress in terms of several imbalances, some 
escalating stress and others offsetting it. 
From an efficient-market perspective, financial crises are shock events and therefore cannot 
be predicted. Efficient-markets theory tells us that it is impossible to know the timing of these 
shocks. Even if it were possible, this perspective tells us that bubble‐pricking policy would be 
problematic because “it presumes that you know more than the market.”
25 The theory also 
highlights a serious technical challenge for monitoring asset bubbles, claiming absolutely that 
since embedded pricing factors are unobservable in the market, it is empirically impossible to 
verify asset-price bubbles.
26 Furthermore, the divergence may result either from embedded price 
factors or from underlying economic fundamentals (state variables), and it is impossible to 
determine which is responsible.
27 Economists who believe that markets are fundamentally 
                                                            
25   Alan Greenspan, quoted in the New York Times, November 15, 1998. 
26   A feature shared by asset bubbles is that prices increase at a higher rate than any that could be 
explained by underlying fundamentals (Kindleberger, 1992). 
27   Cogley (1999). 31 
 
efficient argue that it is therefore better to focus on crisis resolution mechanisms after crises 
occur. 
From an empirical perspective, however, crises are not only about the timing of asset price 
bubbles, but also about a variety of factors that evolve slowly over time. These factors are 
observable
28 and tend to have common features: 
  Asset prices that are excessive relative to a central tendency or trend, which implicitly 
represent a longer-term equilibrium based on a stable set of expectations, financial 
technology, etc.; 
  Lots of leverage, which fuels excessive asset prices. Because financial institutions’ 
balance sheets and certain asset classes (such as real estate) are highly leveraged, they 
tend to play a major part in financial crises; 
  A networked financial system which, combined with leveraged financial firms, can 
“spill” asset losses and funding problems from one institution to another, putting the 
entire system at risk.
29 
One practical constraint in observing imbalances is the difficulty of relating them to the 
economy. Shiller measures housing imbalances by deflating them by aggregate housing value.
30 
Borio et al. (1994, 2002, 2009) measure imbalances by deflating them by GDP. The SAFE EWS 
measures imbalances by deflating them by aggregate assets or relevant price indexes. 
                                                            
28   Robert Shiller (2008) notes that it is surprising that the experts failed to recognize the bubble as it was 
forming. Strictly speaking, this is not quite accurate. As Alan Greenspan testified before Congress in 
2005, the buildup was observed and gave policymakers serious concern “that the protracted period of 
the underpricing of risk…would have dire consequences” (Greenspan, 2008). 
29   These factors are not unique to the United States and can also be observed in developing countries’ 
financial crises. The United States possesses a reserve currency that is capable of stopping spillover 
effects; by contrast, a developing country may be forced to appeal to the IMF for help in stopping 
crisis spillovers. 
30   See discussion in Standard & Poor’s (2008), p.10. 32 
 
The second major difficulty lies in relating one observed imbalance to others. In normally 
functioning markets, institutions can efficiently estimate risk and hedge it, while sustaining the 
financial system’s balance and growth. How can a policymaker make an informed judgment that 
institutions’ estimates of risk are becoming biased at a particular time, and that the markets’ 
growth is becoming “irrationally exuberant”? SAFE meets this challenge by consistently 
estimating fundamentals of various asset classes and the structural characteristics of the system. 
Thus, a measurement error in a single imbalance, caused by a biased estimate of its fundamental 
value, is minimized by combining a number of positive and negative imbalances within a SAFE 
OLS model. By looking at several offsetting imbalances together, SAFE OLS estimates are 
BLUE—best linear unbiased estimators. 
In addition, SAFE EWS assists policymakers’ decision process by allowing them to target a 
particular action threshold above the previous mean of the financial stress series. What should 
the threshold be? Should policymakers target half a standard deviation of financial stress, or one 
standard deviation, or some other threshold? In the absence of a more rigorous theoretical 
framework, the SAFE EWS can help empirically. As we show in case study 2 below, iterative 
review of retrospective SAFE forecasts in a series of historical stress episodes can establish the 
difference in standard deviations between SAFE EWS forecasts and the coincident financial 
stress at the time of the forecast. Policymakers could then formulate a set of stress episodes when 
additional supervisory involvement could be contemplated to reduce economic losses. 
Comparing the difference between SAFE forecasts of financial stress and the coincident stress 
mean for all stress episodes would enable policymakers to identify the optimal target level at 
which policymakers should become involved. When forecasts of stress fall short of the target 
action level, the historical evidence would support the case that markets can self-resolve at a 33 
 
particular level of stress. When a forecast of stress exceeds the target level, policymakers can 
weigh the economic costs of preventive regulatory action against the economic costs of a shock, 
bringing the aggregate imbalances back to fundamentals. 
The following simplified case study illustrates the process by which the SAFE EWS can 
facilitate policymakers’ selection of action thresholds. 
4.2.1. Case study 2: Selecting action thresholds in historic stress episodes 
In this case study, we test SAFE’s hypothetical performance against three historic stress 
episodes: the dot-com episode (Q4:1999–Q1:2000); the stock market downturn (Q2:2002–
Q4:2002); and the subprime episode (Q4:2007–Q1:2008). Considering these episodes’ ex-post 
and economic costs, policymakers would probably agree that no regulatory action was needed 
during the 2002 stock market downturn. They would also be likely to agree that regulatory 
preventive action prior to the subprime episode might have helped to alleviate the economic 
costs of the crisis and perhaps even to forestall it. The decision might be less clear in the dot-com 
episode. Those who reject the idea of regulatory intervention could point out that the stress 
episode was essentially a stock-market correction of overvalued high-tech firms. Those who 
accept the idea could point out that the correction was far from soft and, in fact, that it gave the 
U.S. economy a powerful push toward the early 2000s recession. 
Table 14 shows the results of the policy horse race for the models: the financial stress series 
z-score dropped 0.3 standard deviations from its level six quarters before the stock market 
downturn, supporting the notion that the episode was benign. In contrast, the stress series moved 
up almost 0.7 standard deviation from Q2:1998 to the dot-com crisis, and almost 2.9 standard 
deviations from Q2:2006 to the subprime crisis. Depending on the their belief in the cost 
efficiency of preventive action for the dot-com crisis, policymakers using the SAFE EWS to help 34 
 
establish a target threshold might set it below or above 0.7 standard deviation from the financial-
stress-series mean at the time of a forecast. 
The results shown in the table also support our previous argument that selecting a single 
“best” SAFE model is ill-advised. The policy horse race shows that the best model continually 
changes. It also shows that some SAFE models do consistently well. Clearly, the current set of 
SAFE models can be used in various ways; for example, policymakers can consider only the top 
model at the time of each quarterly forecast, or several of the top models. 
Insert Table 14 about here 
 
We conclude the case study 2 illustration of a policy application with a retrospective case 
study of the out-of-sample subprime episode (see Fig.5). Let us suppose that policymakers have 
the use of the SAFE EWS during Q2:2006. Observing the financial stress series at this time 
would give them no reason for concern. In fact, by the time the data for a fresh quarterly 
observation of FSI is assembled from the daily observations, they would even observe a short-
term trend downward as the financial markets continue to boom. Policymakers would like to 
anticipate possible scenarios of future financial stress six quarters forward—in this case, during 
Q4:2007 and Q1:2008. To do this, as suggested by the policy-horse-race results above, they 
would like to consider alternative plausible imbalance stories as given by several top SAFE EWS 
models. Calibrated to Q2:2006, the top three short-lag models are numbers 2, 4, and 7. As the 
forecast is run, all three of these models show significant increases relative to the current level of 
stress. Moreover, they all show that the trend does not peak at the forecast horizon, but in fact 
originates much earlier—during Q2:2007.
31 This forecast poses two critical questions for 
                                                            
31   Simulating forecasts in subsequent quarters, one can observe that, as would be expected, the models 
tend to converge as the forecasting window narrows. 35 
 
policymakers. First, is the anticipated increase in financial stress real or illusory? Second, if the 
increase is real, is it critical enough to risk introducing some corrective measures early in 2006 in 
order to diffuse the projected buildup of stress? If the buildup is illusory and policymakers 
introduce prophylactic measures to reduce the imbalances, they risk cramping a healthy 
economy. If they do nothing, financial market stress threatens to worsen. The choice of action or 
inaction is critical. To provide further policymaking insight, an EWS researcher must be ready to 
say which channels of prophylactic action should be open to policymakers. We intend to address 
both of these questions within a more rigorous theoretical foundation in a follow-up study. 
Insert Fig. 5 about here 
 
4.2.2. Case study 3: The financial crisis 
The financial crisis of 2008 tests the forecasting accuracy of both the short- and long-lag 
models. Although the pinnacle of the crisis may have been marked by the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and the subsequent quantitative easing, there may also have been signs of stress as early 
as Q1:2007. Reading the signs then would have provided more time to consider monetary and/or 
supervisory policy actions to help mitigate developing stress before the crisis. We next consider 
forecasts from short- and long-lag models. 
Short-lag forecasts 
Several short-lag models predicted the advent of stress starting in Q2:2007 and, in some 
cases, continuing throughout that year (see Fig. 2). In particular, six of eight short-lag models 
predicted stress, significantly more than in the comparatively quiet years leading up to the crisis 36 
 
(see Fig. 6). In particular, models 2 and 8 predicted early stress in Q2:2007, while other models, 
such as number 4, predicted stress with a lag. 
Although the majority of short-lag models contain an autoregressive explanatory variable, 
several additional key explanatory variables may be valuable for predicting financial stress. The 
extent of the contribution to early financial stress depends on the chosen lag of the explanatory 
variables and on the actual variables included in the forecast. For example, model 2 predicted a 
rapid increase in stress, beginning in Q2:2007. The observed shrinking value of Liq_5 (liquidity) 
and the increasing value of Str_4 (the FX currency-market concentration) in this model were the 
leading contributors to the rising stress level in the forecast period. This forecast indicates that 
previous values of Liq_5 were decreasing, a sign that the model’s top five institutions were under 
liquidity constraints. Moreover, a rising value of Str_4 indicates an increase in future financial 
stress because this value measures larger firms’ exposure relative to the aggregate foreign-
exchange currency markets; in other words, larger firms bear a greater share of the risk 
associated with this market). Specifically, Liq_5 and Str_4 added 29.1 and 22.5 units, 
respectively, in Q2:2007 and added 28.9 and 21.5 units, respectively, in Q3:2007. 
Insert Fig. 6 about here 
 
Other models, such as number 4, predicted that stress would be present at different horizons. 
Model 4 predicted that financial stress would be subdued in the first two quarters but would 
increase significantly in Q4:2007. Furthermore, this effect was driven mainly by slightly 
different variables, including Liq_6 (stress-sale liquidity) and Str_4.1 (interbank currency-market 
concentration). The remaining models identified other noteworthy variables, such as Ret_2cpi 37 
 
(capital markets), Rsk_8a (expected default frequency), and Rsk_L (solvency-stress distance 
from systemic stress). 
Long-lag forecasts 
Long-lag models allow us to forecast stress at longer horizons, which is an advantage for ex-
ante policy actions. The value of a forecast with a longer horizon is that it highlights factors that 
tend to contribute to stress in the longer term (at least six quarters). 
As in the shorter-horizon forecasts, we can analyze which variables were important in 
signaling financial stress. Several long-lag forecasts predicted a notable increase in stress 
through Q3:2008 (see Fig. 7). Two significant drivers of stress throughout the forecast period 
were Liq_6 (three-month forward sale) and Liq_7 (fire sale). Like Liq_5 in short-lag model 2, a 
decreasing value of Liq_6 and Liq_7 signals an increase in future financial stress because the 
value is a sign that these firms lack liquidity relative to the past. These variables added as much 
as 18 units of stress in the first two quarters of the forecast period. 
Insert Fig. 7 about here 
 
Another important driver of stress was Rsk_8a (the expected default frequency), which added 
as much as 21 units of stress in the first quarter of the forecast (LL4), and as much as 21 units 
toward the end of the forecast period (LL3). The expected default frequency (EDF) measures the 
probability of institutional default, as described by Moody’s KMV; an increase in the EDF value 
signals future financial stress. The growing likelihood of default has several cause-and-effect 
connections. For example, an increase in EDF could lead to an increase in counterparty risk, 
which in turn could create difficulties in raising liquidity, thus accentuating the likelihood of 
stress. We see similar examples of these types of connections when we analyze the long-lag 38 
 
forecasts further. As EDF and liquidity variables lead to financial stress, we observe an increase 
in Str_9 (leverage), which becomes an important driver of stress only toward the end of the 
forecast period. This implies that firms have a higher amount of risky debt relative to safer 
capital, which historically has been a critical driver of financial stress during crises. The increase 
in leverage may itself have been caused indirectly by previous increases in Liq_6, Liq_7, and 
Rsk_8a. 
5. Conclusions and future work 
This paper’s main contribution has been to demonstrate the existence of a significant 
association between institutional imbalances, system structure, and financial market stress and to 
explain this association. The paper also shows significant results in terms of statistical 
significance, expected direction, and Granger causality. 
The results of the EWS developed here focus attention on imbalances that have strong 
positive and negative associations with financial stress. The SAFE EWS tests the theoretical 
expectations of positive and negative impacts on financial stress simultaneously, which allows a 
consistent approach to evaluating systemic banking risk. By comparing the performance of 
models that use public data with those that use private (supervisory) information, the paper finds 
evidence of the value of supervisory data. In addition, it discusses the use and relative 
performance of the SAFE EWS calibrated using only the data publicly available to U.S. financial 
institutions. 
Compared with the preceding EWSs, the SAFE EWS adds a number of innovative features. 
It is a hybrid EWS framework, which combines macroeconomic variables with institution-
specific data. It benefits from a very rich dataset of public and private supervisory data, 
integrating a number of previously stand-alone supervisory tools and surveillance models. From 39 
 
the methodological viewpoint, the SAFE EWS extends the optimal lag approach and clarifies 
model selection criteria. In addition, it provides a toolkit of alternative imbalance stories to suit a 
variety of possible propagation mechanisms in a given systemic stress episode. 
In terms of its architecture and typology, SAFE extends the theoretical precedents in EWS 
variables by suggesting that they fall into four classes of imbalances: return, risk, liquidity, and 
structure. Although researchers have long recognized structural effects, until now they have not 
incorporated them into an EWS of systemic risk. Moreover, the SAFE EWS incorporates a 
feedback amplification mechanism. Feedback mechanisms are particularly prone to measurement 
error and should be treated cautiously by the EWS researcher. Nevertheless, as SAFE shows in 
the analysis of public and private data blocks, the amplification mechanism can add significant 
explanatory power and deserves further consideration. In particular, the liquidity feedback 
mechanism appears in most SAFE models through a liquidity-independent variable and serves as 
a critical valuation engine for some of the more dominant risk-imbalance variables. From the 
financial supervisor’s point of view, an EWS involves an ex-ante approach to regulation that is 
designed to predict and prevent crises. A hazard inherent in all ex-ante models is that their 
uncertainty may lead to wrong policy choices. To mitigate this risk, SAFE develops two 
modeling perspectives: a set of long-lag (six or more quarters) forecasting specifications that 
give policymakers enough time for ex-ante policy action, and a set of short-lag forecasting 
specifications for verification and adjustment of supervisory actions. 
This paper only begins to address the important analytical question of how various 
specifications performed in historic periods of financial stress. It could be extended in several 
ways. For example, it would be useful to discuss further the important variables selected by the 
model, their applicability to supervisory policy and their marginal impacts, and to verify whether 40 
 
the variables indeed mattered and, if not, why not. Particular attention should be focused on the 
time pattern of evolving financial stress, that is, the speed and amplification dynamic of 
upcoming financial crises. It is also vital to devote close attention to analyzing the model’s 
performance, considering the economic interpretation of the results. This may also extend to 
testing the model for different scenarios and to including new variables. To provide further 
policymaking insights, the EWS researcher should be ready to support the channels of 
prophylactic action that may open in response to a particular set of imbalances, and should be 
able to evaluate the impact of regulatory changes on financial stress in “real time.” Finally, it is 
important to extend the EWS model to financial intermediaries other than bank holding 
companies. 
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National economic                         
a)  GDP  national  X  X     X  X      X    
b)  Credit/GDP  national  X X X X X X      X  (X)    
c)  Equity    X X X X X  (X) X X X  (X) X 
d)  Property        X  X  (X) X     X 
e )   I n v e s t m e n t s      X      X         
International economic                         
a )   G D P   i n t e r n a t i o n a l         X         
b)  Credit/GDP  international              
c)  Equity         (X) X  (X)   (X) X 
d) Foreign exchange rate  (X)  X    X  X      (X)       X 
e)  Exports/Imports  (X)  X     X         X 
Financial system                         
a)  Interbank  lending    X     (X)  (X)       (X)  
b)  Leverage    (X)        X      
c)  Interest  rate  X  X    X  X    X  X  
d)  Competition,  concentration        X  X      
e)  Risk  appetite,  discipline          X    (X) X   
f )   C o m p l e x i t y          X   X       
g)  Dynamics,  volatility          X    X  X   






Fig. 1. Imbalances as deviations from fundamentals reflect potential shocks. 
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Table 2 
Explanatory variable classes in the SAFE model. 
Explanatory Variable 
Classes  Construction classes 
Return imbalances 
Through asset price boom/bust 
| By markets / products in: 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
|| Equity markets 
|| Credit markets 




RISK TRANSFER / DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
|| Securitizations markets 
|| Credit Derivatives markets 







Though Funding Liquidity channels 












        7.85   0.60        0.24      
DF=58                                             K=2 






Estimates 7.85  0.60  0.24 
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Panel C: 
Short Lag Base 
Model 
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Estimates  38.77  0.40 2.06 8.65 8.15 -2.94  -4.55 
0.63  6.49  6.74  t-value  (5.65) (3.93) (2.78) (3.14) (3.38) (1.03) (3.16) 
Granger    ††   ††   †† 
Panel D: 
Long Lag Base 
Model 
        37.85   9.88  _   3     2.29         2.24  _         4.55  _        11.20  _       
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0.51  6.75  6.96  t-value  (6.20) (3.05) (2.06) (1.85) (2.13) (3.68) 
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Table 5 
Summary of short-lag model stories. 
Model Story  Positive  Negative 
(1) ASLS adj FSI 
Structure
+  Leverage  ∆ Credit risk capital 
Risk
-  ∆ FX concentration  ∆ Interest rate risk capital 
Return
+/-  ∆ Market capitalization  Commercial prop credit 
(2) ASLMR adj 
Structure
+  ∆ FX concentration  ∆ Interest rate risk capital 
Risk
-  ∆ Equity market concentration  Shock liquidity 
Liquidity
-  Leverage  Solvency 
(3) BSLS adj 
Structure
+  ∆ FX concentration  Shock liquidity 
Risk
-  Leverage  Credit risk dist to syst stress 
Return
+  Liquidity
-  ∆ Market capitalization  Solvency 
(4) BSLMR adj 
Structure
+  ∆ FX concentration  ∆ Interest rate risk capital 
Risk
-  ∆ Equity market concentration  ∆ Credit risk capital 
Risk
+  Return
-  Expected default frequency  Commercial property credit 
(5) CSLS adj 
Structure
+  ∆Equity market concentration  ∆Credit risk dist to syst stress 
Risk
-  Connectivity  ∆Solvency dist to syst stress 
  ∆Connectivity  
(6) CSLMR adj 
Structure
+  ∆Equity market concentration  ∆Credit risk dist to syst stress 
Risk
+  Leverage  ∆ Interest rate risk capital 
Liquidity
+  Return
-  AL mismatch  Interest risk derivatives 
(7) rev DSLS adj2 
Structure
+  Int rate risk dist to stress  Solvency dist to syst stress 
Risk-  Total credit cpi  Credit risk dist to syst stress 
Risk
+  Return
+  ∆FX concentration  ∆Credit risk dist to stress 
(8) DSLMR adj 
Structure
+  ∆FX concentration  ∆Commercial property credit 
Risk
-  FX concentration  Solvency dist to syst stress 
Return
-  Interbank concentration  Credit risk dist to syst stress 
      
Legend: 
 
Structure  Risk 
Return  Liquidity 
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Table 6 
In-sample regression results for SAFE EWS short-lag models. 


































RET_1.1cpi         5   Capital Markets – Equity (price-based) 
11.810 
(4.56)***          
RET_2cpi       _    Capital Markets - Bonds (price-based)        7.723 
(4.16)***   
RET_4ta             Capital Markets - Commercial Property (total assets-
based) 
-7.958 
(-6.93)***    -5.195  
(-2.74)***       
RET_4ta         5   Capital Markets - Commercial Property (total assets-
based 
        -10.673 
(-5.06)*** 
RET_5.2ta             Interbank Derivative Exposure    -1.192† 
(-1.78)***         
RET_6cpi         _    Currency Markets - Interbank Exposures (price-based)        -3.076 
(-2.86)***   
RET_6ta           	 Currency Markets - Interbank Exposures (total assets-
based) 
2.193† 







(2.28)**     
RET_9ta             Risk Transfer Markets - IR Derivatives (total assets-
based) 
      -4.298†† 
(-2.48)**     
RISK VARIABLES 
RSK_2         3   IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function 
-11.536†† 
(-7.59)***          
RSK_2.1       _     IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function    3.344 
(4.93)*** 
1.655† 
(2.68)**      4.859† 
(5.40)***    2.319† 
(9.07)*** 
RSK_4       _     IRR Indicators - point-in-time/stress function        13.243† 
(4.33)***   
RSK_6 
      5  
      _     IRR Indicators - extreme stress/crisis function    -13.443†† 
(-4.63)***    -9.156†† 
(-2.66)**    -5.095†† 
(-3.15)***     
RSK_7.1        _     Credit Risk Indicators - through the cycle function 
-13.191† 
(-5.81)***    -7.290† 
(-2.02)**       




(2.81)***    2.081 






RSK_9     _     Economic Value : 12 call report loan portfolios - 99.5% 
BankCaR 
      -2.588 
(-2.16)***     
RSK_14      _     Solvency - through the cycle function    -2.378† 
(-3.42)***         
RSK_15      _     Solvency - point-in-time/stress function        -3.514 
(-1.74)*     
RSK_16      _     Solvency - extreme stress/crisis function          -4.554 
(-3.90)*** 
RSK_F    _       Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-systemic stress     -2.421 
(-3.30)***       
RSK_G    _       Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-stress    2.811†† 
(2.66)**    2.811†† 
(10.32)*** 
2.637†† 
(2.73)***     
RSK_H    _       Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic stress 
-4.997† 
(-3.86)***    -2.291 
(-1.46)***    -2.291 
(-1.78)*    -53.223† 
(-6.09) ***   
RSK_H     _       Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic stress    -8.422 
(-1.70) *    -8.422 
-1.86* 
-12.133† 
(-4.68)***     
RSK_I    _       Credit Risk - normal distance-to-systemic stress          -4.036† 
(-3.60)*** 
RSK_I         5   Credit Risk - normal distance-to-systemic stress    -9.465 
(-4.15)***    -9.465 
(-7.50)***    -5.924 
(-3.44)***   
RSK_K          4   Credit Risk - normal distance-to-stress          4.731 
(4.22) *** 
RSK_L     _       Solvency - stress distance-to-systemic stress        -72.690†† 
(-5.63) ***   
RSK_L         5   Solvency - stress distance-to-systemic stress    -5.251 
(-2.53)**    -5.251†† 
(-6.88)***       
RSK_M     _       Solvency - normal distance-to-systemic stress 
-2.531†† 
(-4.71)***    -2.183†† 
(-2.17)***  ††  -3.662† 
(-3.73)***     
LIQUIDITY VARIABLES 
LIQ_1    _  03   AL Gap Indicators - '0 to 3 months' maturity band     1.491 
(2.04) **       
LIQ_2    _  312   AL Gap Indicators - '3 to 12 months' maturity band 
1.556† 
(2.17)**          
LIQ_2      3122   AL Gap Indicators - '3 to 12 months' maturity band        2.453 
(2.43)*   
LIQ_4    _   3   AL Gap Indicators - 'greater than 3 years' maturity band    3.007 
(5.84)***    3.007 
(7.64)*** 
5.665 
(6.14)***     




(-3.43)      -3.751 
(-2.75)***   







(-1.24)     
STRUCTURE VARIABLES 
STR_1.2    _ 5      Connectivity Indicators – CoVaR at 5% 
3.667 
(6.69)***         1.596 
(2.90) *** 
STR_1.3     1   3   Connectivity Indicators – Delta CoVaR at 1%    6.278 
(1.69) *    6.278 
(2.51)**       









(2.29)**   
STR_2      5   Concentration Indicators - Capital Markets (Equity)    14.322† 







(2.17)**   
STR_4    _      Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (FX)    21.051†† 




STR_4      4    Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (FX) 
54.066†† 












STR_4.1    _       Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (FX) 
2.778 
(7.43)***    10.320†† 
(4.33)***        1.436† 
(2.73)*** 




STR_8        5   Concentration Indicators - Risk Transfer Markets (IR 
Derivatives) 
         3.310†† 
(5.41)*** 




(2.85)***    13.065†† 
(4.69)***    7.071 
(2.36)** 
4.717†† 
(1.39)   
DYNAMIC        












(2.77)***    0.134 
(2.07)** 
CONSTANT  21.440 39.182 28.388 40.873 28.388 52.213 22.284  26.935 
OBSERVATIONS  56 54 56 55 53 55 56  58 
R-squared  0.84 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.87  0.81 
AIC (OLS)  5.90 5.88 6.19 5.83 6.19 6.11 5.66  6.00 
SC (OLS)  6.48 6.28 6.72 6.42 6.72 6.77 6.23  6.49 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is shown in parentheses. Theoretical expectations are noted by +/-/≠0. Statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The significance of Granger 
causality at 20% and 10% is shown by † and ††, respectively. § denotes Newey-West errors.56 
 
Table 7 
In-sample regression results for SAFE EWS long-lag models. 























    





RET_2ta             Capital Markets - Bonds(total assets based 
-11.549 
(2.442)** 
       
RET_4ta         5  








RET_6cpi         _    Currency Markets - Interbank Exposures (price-based) 
-4.077† 
(3.149)*** 







RET_6ta           	
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RISK VARIABLES 
RSK_2         3   IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function 
-6.019†† 
(2.142)** 



























Market Value : 12 call report loan portfolios (w. EDF 
uncertainty) 
    
-21.451 
(2.615)** 
   
RSK_11  SABRDPR
+ 





      
RSK_14      _     Solvency - through the cycle function     
-7.377 
(2.835)** 
    
RSK_15      _     Solvency - point-in-time/stress function 
-6.120 
(3.152)*** 
       




-  Interest Rate Risk - stress distance-to-systemic stress    
-1.620 
(2.485)** 
     
RSK_G    _       Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-stress 
3.268 
(2.673)*** 
       
RSK_H     _       Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic stress   
-18.655 
(3.230)*** 











   
-3.549†† 
(3.292)*** 
RSK_K          4   Credit Risk - normal distance-to-stress    
4.086 
(2.269)** 
     
RSK_L     _       Solvency - stress distance-to-systemic stress      
-3.602†† 
(1.938)* 
   











    



















    






















STR_1.2    _ 5      Connectivity Indicators – CoVaR at 5%     2.406†† 
(2.001)*    3.853†† 
(3.666)***    4.851†† 
(4.999)*** 
STR_1.3     1   3   Connectivity Indicators – Delta CoVaR at 1%        3.912 
(2.883)***   
STR_1.4    _ 5      Connectivity Indicators – Delta CoVaR at 5%    3.393 
(2.310)**      2.610 
(1.660)*   
STR_2      5   Concentration Indicators - Capital Markets (Equity) 
9.118 
(3.565)***     7.778 
(3.047)***     
STR_4      4    Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (FX) 
1.843†† 
(2.622)***         












(2.414)**    5.510 
(3.082)***    
STR_8        5   Concentration Indicators - Risk Transfer Markets (IR 
Derivatives) 





(3.083)***    

















CONSTANT  68.430 20.321 26.290 43.936 28.670 49.921 59.861 55.316 
OBSERVATIONS  56 50 53 52 52 53 50 52 
R-squared  0.708 0.778 0.834 0.703 0.707 0.766 0.754 0.815 
AIC (OLS)  6.354 6.156 5.891 6.423 6.381 6.162 6.246 5.947 
SC (OLS)  6.860 6.615 6.411 6.911 6.8312  6.646 6.667 6.434 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is shown in parentheses. Theoretical expectations are noted by +/-/≠0. Statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The significance of Granger 
causality at 20% and 10% is shown by † and ††, respectively.   57 
 
Table 8 


























RMSE  9.54 5.40 4.93 6.18 5.08 8.10 4.77 5.21 
MAPE  8.34 7.59 8.00 7.38 7.84 7.80 6.41 7.56 






















RMSE  7.736 10.264  11.031  11.82 15.38 12.444  13.53 11.694 
MAPE 13.168 14.351 14.507 15.645 15.542 18.541 21.701 17.409 


















(5) (6)  (6)  (4)  (4) 
(7) (4)  (7)  (2)  (7) 
(4) (5)  (4)  (7)  (6) 














-  FRS – FDR micro data 
-  CRSP 
-  S&P Case-Shiller data 
-  MIT CRE data 
-  FRS – FDR micro data 
-  Moody’s 
-  FRS – FDR micro data 
-  Moody’s  
-  FRS – FDR micro data 
-  CRSP 
-  FRS - CoVaR model 
-  FRS - Flow of Funds 
†  FRS – X-Country data  ††  FRS - IRR FOCUS 
††  FRS - BankCaR 
††  FRS – SABR/SEER 
†† FRBC  –SCAP-haircut 
††  FRBC – LFM 
††  FRS - IRR FOCUS 
††  FRS - BankCaR 
†† FRS  –CAMELS 
†† FRS-SABR/SEER   
†† FRBC  –SCAP-haircut 
††  FRBC – LFM 
†  FRS – X-Country data 
Note: Clear row indicates public data. Shaded row indicates supervisory data. Confidential supervisory data 




Proportion of supervisory variables among imbalance classes. 
Imbalance Class  Supervisory series  Proportion FRS 
Total 33  50.0  percent 
Return Imbalances  1  10.0 percent 
Liquidity Imbalances  3  42.9 percent 
Risk Imbalances  28  82.4 percent 





Comparative statistics of supervisory and public specifications. 
Panel A: short-lag 
comparison    Bench 
mark  SL  Base  SL(1) SL(2) SL(3) SL(4) SL(5) SL(6) SL(7) SL(8) 
PUBLIC 
in-sample 
Obs  59 62 59 54 62 55 59 58 56 59 
R-squared  0.51 0.59 0.75 0.71 0.59 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.76 0.77 
AIC  (OLS)  6.78 6.6  6.27 6.38 6.6  6.49 6.55 6.63 6.23 6.15 
SC  (OLS)  6.89 6.81 6.72 6.71 6.81 6.9  6.84 7.02 6.63 6.53 
PUBLIC 
out-of-sample  RMSE 8.48 7.68 9.34 8.49 8.66 6.97 6.13 8.18 6.38 5.73 
 
MAPE  12.32 5.68  9.39  10.37 12.35 9.69  10.54 10.85 8.59  8.44 
Theil  U 0.082 0.073 0.093 0.077 0.082 0.07  0.063 0.082 0.064 0.058 
              
PRIVATE 
in-sample 
Obs    53 56 54 56 55 53 55 56 58 
R-squared    0.61 0.84 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.8  0.87 0.81 
AIC  (OLS)    6.59 5.9  5.88 6.19 5.83 6.19 6.11 5.66 6 
SC  (OLS)    6.84 6.48 6.28 6.72 6.42 6.72 6.77 6.23 6.49 
PRIVATE 
out-of-sample 
RMSE   7.88 9.54 5.4  4.93 6.18 5.08 8.1  4.77 5.21 
MAPE   10.94  8.34 7.59 8  7.38 7.84 7.8  6.41 7.56 
Theil  U   0.074 0.093 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.051 0.081 0.048 0.052 
Panel B: long-lag 
comparison      LL  Base  LL1 LL2 LL3 LL4 LL5 LL6 LL7 LL8 
PUBLIC 
in-sample 
Obs    57 56 50 57 56 60 53 50 56 
R-squared    0.36 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.39 0.66 0.67 0.39 
AIC  (OLS)    6.99 6.84 6.78 6.76 6.82 6.99 6.49 6.51 7.02 
SC  (OLS)    7.13 7.24 7.01 7.08 7.11 7.30 6.87 6.85 7.31 
PUBLIC 
out-of-sample 
RMSE    17.85 15.07 21.15 25.21 17.86 16.45 28.70 26.48 19.47 
MAPE    20.49 18.15 21.08 24.17 20.11 19.16 26.19 25.08 20.63 
Theil  U   0.164 0.138 0.184 0.221 0.159 0.154 0.248 0.235 0.178 
              
PRIVATE 
in-sample 
Obs    57 56 50 53 52 52 53 50 52 
R-squared    0.52 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.82 
AIC  (OLS)    6.75 6.35 6.16 5.89 6.42 6.38 6.16 6.25 5.95 
SC  (OLS)    6.96 6.86 6.61 6.41 6.91 6.83 6.65 6.67 6.43 
PRIVATE 
out-of-sample 
RMSE    14.62 18.82 12.64 19.95 18.91 15.38 27.56 27.01 26.29 
MAPE    16.72 17.86 13.79 18.40 19.13 15.54 24.53 23.78 21.93 





Policy horse race results ranked by SAFE to FSI variance. 
Episode  Δ FSI  Ave  Best  Top 2  Top 3  Top 4  SL(1)  SL(2) SL(3) SL(4) SL(5) SL(6) SL(7) SL(8) 
Dot-com crisis  0.68  -1.41  2.08  -0.61  -1.61  -1.46  2.08  -1.01 -0.13 -0.31 -2.17 -3.30  -3.61 -2.86 
Stock Market downturn  -0.32  -0.18  -0.64  -0.17  -0.30  -0.33 -0.34 0.35 -0.36 -0.57 -0.42 -0.64  0.21  0.30 
Subprime crisis  2.86  1.71  3.44  2.16  1.84  1.74  1.43 2.51 0.88  3.44 1.13 1.23 1.20 1.85 
               






















II I III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008













I  II I  I  I IV I  II II  I  IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I




































I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III





Appendix A. Description of explanatory data 
Four classes of explanatory variables are tested: return, risk, liquidity, and structure. 
Financial stress is frequently associated with shocks from deflating asset bubbles that 
characterize irrational expectations of returns. Accordingly, return indicators consist of data 
useful in monitoring the formation of expectation bubbles in returns. The indicators are designed 
to capture imbalances in various asset markets, a key aspect of expectation bubbles. The 
methodology extends the work of Borio et al. (1994). Borio analyzes three separate asset classes 
(equities, residential property, and commercial property). The EWS model expands this approach 
to include additional asset classes: equities; bonds; residential and commercial property in the 
capital markets; international and interbank exposure in the currency markets; securitizations, 
credit derivatives, and interest-rate derivatives in the risk-transfer markets. 
Risk indicators consist of data useful for monitoring unsustainable or irrational risk-taking, 
which can lead to institutional and aggregate accumulation of risk beyond a rational equilibrium 
value. The risk data is based both on publicly available financial information and on private 
supervisory EWS of individual institutions’ risk. Public information is used in risk indicators for 
two components, market and credit, and can be observed over time by comparing three distinct 
time series for each risk: the book value, market value, and economic value of the corresponding 
assets. The economic-value time series is obtained through private supervisory FRB-IRR Focus 
and FRB-Bank CaR (Frye and Pelz, 2008) models. Private supervisory risk data is based on 
application of the FRB-SABR model to historic data. 
Liquidity indicators consist of time-series data incorporating both funding- and asset-
liquidity data through a maturity-band-differentiated net liquidity time series. Each time point is 
represented by two sets of liquidity components: a set of asset-liability mismatch measures by 64 
 
each maturity band; and a set of liquidity index measures based on the valuations of all assets 
and liabilities relative to three time-horizon points: immediate fire sale; three-month forward 
sale; and 1-year forward sale. The data applies asset-liability classification and assumptions from 
the FRB-IRR Focus model. The following four maturity bands are used for both assets and 
liabilities: 0–3 months, 3–12 months, 1–3 years, and more than 3 years. Available funding 
liquidity for each maturity band is tracked through two sets of data: components of total large 
and small time deposits and components of other borrowed money, including FHLB advances). 
Available asset liquidity for each maturity band is tracked through four sets of data: components 
of first-lien, 1–4-family mortgages loans and pass-throughs; components of CMOs and mortgage 
derivatives; all other loans; and all other securities. 
Structural indicators consist of time-series data describing organizational features of the 
financial system. The model tests three distinct types of structural data: connectivity, 
concentration, and contagion.
a Connectivity data describes structural fragility through a measure 
of individual institutions’ interconnectedness and marginal impact on the aggregate financial 
system. The data is obtained by means of a sub-model using a correlation approach. The model 
applies Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2008) CoVaR technique measuring the relative contribution 
of firms to systemic risk (CoVaR), which is measured as “the value at risk (VaR) of financial 
institutions conditional on other institutions being in distress. The increase of CoVaR relative to 
VaR measures spillover risk among institutions.”
b CoVar, as a connectivity indicator, is 
estimated using quantile regressions. Concentration data describes structural fragility due to 
                                                            
a  The model evolved independently through the concurrent work of James Thomson (2009) on the 
identification of systemic institutions. Thomson proposed the “4C’s” (correlation, concentration, 
contagion, and conditions) as a basis for selecting systemically important institutions. The conditions 
component is akin to expectations in the SAFE model. Thus, there is a conceptual parallel between 
the 4C’s and SAFE architecture when correlation, concentration, and contagion are considered as 
forms of structural variables and conditions as a form of expectations variables. 65 
 
concentrations in the exposure profile, both on- and off-balance sheets. A higher concentration 
indicates increased susceptibility to stress due to expectation shocks. Concentration is measured 
through the market share for institutions and the aggregate Herfindahl index measured for the 
capital, currency, and risk-transfer markets. Separate market-share and Herfindahl measures are 
obtained in each of these markets. An institution’s concentration in a particular market, 
expressed through the corresponding market share, is a useful explanatory indicator of structural 
fragility because it measures the relative position of significant institutions in the financial 
system. Aggregate concentration, expressed through the Herfindahl index, is a useful explanatory 
indicator of structural fragility for the same reason. Contagion data describes the structural 
fragility of individual institutions and the aggregate financial system by the transmission of some 
shock from one entity to other, dependent entities. The economic literature describes financial 
contagion through a variety of these transmission channels, for example, direct transmission via 
interbank credit and liquidity markets and indirect transmission resulting from the general 
deterioration of financial-market conditions. This study considers leverage-based ratios to be a 
useful basis for describing financial contagion as a measure of the “financial immunity” of an 
individual institution or cluster of institutions against a variety of shocks. 
Appendix B. Explanatory variable construction 
B.1. Construction of aggregate imbalances 
All explanatory time-series indicators (that is, indicators of return expectations, risk 
expectations, and liquidity expectations, as well as structural indicators) are aggregated as rolling 
standardized imbalances, an approach developed by Borio and Lowe (2002), and expanded by 
Borio et al. (2009) and Hanschel et al. (2005). This transformation shows the researcher the 
degree of deviation from long-term, historical trends in behavior. Implicit in this approach is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
b   Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). 66 
 
assumption that the historical trend serves as a “proxy for the longer-term fundamental value of a 
variable, around which the actual series fluctuates” (Hanschel, et al., 2005). In a sense, the gap 
between the original series and its trend reflects an economic imbalance. To obtain imbalance 
measures for each indicator, data for the five largest bank holding companies (according to total 
asset size by quarter) are aggregated through simple addition. The equation below articulates this 
logic for an arbitrary indicator X: 
  X   	X ,   X  ,   X  ,   X  ,   X  ,  (3) 
Once Xt is generated, imbalance transformations are performed using the following equation:  
     ≝ Standardized	Imbalance	of	X   	
 X    μ 
  
σ 
     (4) 
where    is the observed value of the reference variable in quarter t,   
 is the historical mean of 
this variable up to quarter t, and   
  is the historical standard deviation of the variable up to 
quarter t. 
Because dollars are the units of aggregations in this category of variables, our imbalance 
measures are likely to increase simply because of inflation. Thus, we control for inflationary 
effects using two separate methods before applying imbalance transformations. One method is to 
deflate aggregate dollar values by a price index. We chose to deflate the majority of series with 
the Consumer Price Index less food and energy. Residential and commercial real estate values 
were more appropriately deflated using more closely-targeted indexes (the Case-Shiller price 
index and the MIT transactions-based commercial real estate price index, respectively). To the 
extent that consumer prices move at a different pace than financial-asset prices, this method 
enables the researcher to examine value imbalances within asset classes rather than real 
imbalances, because relative prices are not constant. 67 
 
We use another method to deflate dollar values: dividing each variable by the aggregate 
value of total assets for the five largest institutions. This method resembles the first; however, 
because it deflates with total assets, relative prices should be much closer to constant, so any 
increase in the imbalance measure in an asset class can be attributed to changes in the level of 
firm activity. Hence, this method will produce measures of what can be called quantity 
imbalances. 
B.2. Construction of return variables 
Accumulated return imbalances are specific to each asset based on its individual 
characteristics. Returns of many asset classes can be observed within different financial markets. 
Because money flows across these various asset markets, disturbances in one market can affect 
the others. Capital markets (equity and credit markets) provide financing through issuance in 
primary markets and trading stocks and bonds in secondary markets. Currency markets support 
short-term financing and investment through both dollar-based interbank markets and foreign-
exchange markets. Returns of risk transfer instruments (securitizations, credit derivatives, and 
interest-rate derivatives) can be observed in the risk-transfer markets, which provide 
opportunities to manage risk by hedging and balance-sheet transformations. 
Return indicators consist of data useful in monitoring the formation of expectation bubbles in 
returns. Financial stress is frequently associated with expectation shocks from deflating assets 
bubbles. The indicators are designed to capture imbalances in various asset markets, a key aspect 
of expectation bubbles. The EWS model utilizes the following asset classes: equities, bonds, 
residential property, and commercial property in the capital markets; international exposure and 
interbank exposure in the currency markets; and securitizations, credit derivatives, and interest-
rate derivatives in the risk-transfer markets. Most data for return variables is publicly available. 68 
 
B.3. Construction of risk variables 
SAFE collects and monitors risk-indicator data along four dimensions: market risk, interest-
rate risk, credit risk, and solvency.
c Accumulated imbalances in market risk exposure cause 
shocks to institutions’ mark-to-market portfolios. Accumulated imbalances in interest-rate risk 
exposure cause interest-rate shocks to institutions’ assets and liabilities. Accumulated imbalances 
in credit risk exposure give rise to shocks associated with failure to meet contractual payment 
obligations. Market, interest-rate, and credit risks can cause significant financial stress in 
institutions and the financial system. In general, unsustainable or irrational risk-taking can cause 
institutional and aggregate accumulation of risk beyond a rational equilibrium value. 
Market risk indicators are constructed on securities to capture the impacts of market risk 
shocks to mark-to-market securities portfolios. SAFE monitors the distance between the 
hypothetical normal, stress, and crisis-scenario valuations of the market risk of on-balance-sheet 
securities, using the following data: for the normal (through-the-cycle) scenario, securities’ book 
value; for the stress (point-in-time) scenario, securities’ market value; and for the crisis scenario, 
change in securities’ economic value. 
Interest-risk indicators are constructed on equity to capture the impact of interest-rate shocks 
on the balance sheets of financial institutions. SAFE monitors the distance between the 
hypothetical normal, stress, and crisis-scenario valuations of interest rates’ on-balance-sheet 
                                                            
c  Solvency may also be considered a useful indicator of structural fragility. A good argument for this 
view can be made on the grounds that insolvency, like systemic risk itself, may arise through a variety 
of mechanisms, for example, failed expectations of return, risk, or liquidity. Capital for a single 
financial institution is the institution’s structural buffer against risk. The aggregate capital of the 
financial system at large represents a measure of collective safeguard  against disjointed failures. The 
capital level should also be considered in assessing the safety and soundness of individual and 
aggregate financial institutions. For the SAFE modeling approach, the choice of where to include 
solvency indicators (as components of risk or as components of structure) is not relevant. We chose to 
include solvency in the set of risk indicators because the construction and use of this indicator 
parallels risk indicators more closely than structural indicators. 69 
 
exposure, using the following data: for the normal (through-the-cycle) scenario, the book value 
of equity less goodwill; for the stress (point-in-time) scenario, the corporate value of equity at 
market value; and for the crisis scenario, the change in the economic value of equity. 
Credit risk indicators capture credit portfolios’ book value, market value, and economic 
value. The book value of the credit portfolios is modeled as the difference between the combined 
value of the 12 call-report loan portfolios and reported allowances for loan and lease losses. The 
market value of credit portfolios is modeled as the difference between expected loss and the 
combined value of the 12 call-report loan portfolios. The economic value of credit portfolios is 
modeled as the difference between the combined value of the 12 call-report loan portfolios and 
their simulated 99.5 percent stress loss from the supervisory Bank CaR model (Frye and Pelz, 
2008). 
Solvency directly reflects the capacity of capital to absorb losses and of funds to repay debts. 
The insolvency of one or more significant institutions creates shocks to the financial system that 
may be either absorbed or amplified, depending on the other structural-fragility factors: 
connectivity, concentration, and leverage. Solvency indicators are constructed to capture the 
difference between an aggregate risk-based capital need (defined as the sum of credit risk, 
market risk, interest-rate risk, and operational risk exposures)
d and available financial resources 
(defined as Tier 1 capital plus ALLL). Like other risk measures, the SAFE model considers 
solvency indicators both as standardized imbalances constructed from interim aggregate levels of 
solvency (under separate book, market, and economic valuations) and as standardized 
imbalances constructed from differences in the respective solvency valuations. 
B.4. Construction of liquidity variables 70 
 
When the market for a particular asset breaks down for any reason, buyers and sellers are 
unable to reach a consensus on the price, and the asset becomes illiquid regardless of its 
underlying value. Managing institutional liquidity is a matter of matching the demand for 
liquidity, reflected through current liabilities, with the supply of liquidity, reflected through 
current assets. Matching involves both funding liquidity and asset liquidity. Reliance on a 
continuous supply of short-term financing involves funding risk that is tied to an institution’s 
ability to match-fund with cash inflows from current assets. A mismatch exists at a particular 
time if incoming cash flows, such as fees, interest due, principal payments, and prepayments, are 
insufficient to meet current liabilities due at that time. To the extent that mismatch exists, 
financial institutions have funding liquidity needs for short-term financing. Because short-term 
financing is typically cheap, institutions are continually tempted to rely on it for meeting 
obligations of all maturities. This, of course, only exacerbates the mismatch across all maturities. 
Moreover, the availability and pricing of short-term financing is highly dependent on an 
institution’s own creditworthiness and the valuations of assets pledged as collateral. Exogenous 
shocks to either current liabilities or current assets can damage creditors’ and counterparties’ 
perception of the institution and its underlying collateral. Aggregate liquidity mismatches 
indicate the presence of funding and asset liquidity on a systemic scale. 
Liquidity risk indicators consist of time-series data incorporating both funding liquidity and 
asset liquidity data through a maturity-band-differentiated net liquidity time-series. Each time 
point is represented by two sets of liquidity components: 1) a set of standardized imbalance 
measures of maturity mismatch, sorted by each maturity band; and 2) a set of standardized 
imbalance measures of a liquidity index that is based on valuations of all assets and liabilities 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
d  Due to current data limitations in operational risk exposures, SAFE implements a measure of 
operational risk exposure similar to the Basel II basic indicator approach. In the future, this 71 
 
relative to three time horizons, namely, immediate fire sale; 3-month forward sale; and 1-year 
forward sale. Most but not all of the underlying asset and liability data used for the maturity 
mismatch measurement is publicly available. However, some coarseness in the granularity of the 
available data necessitates a further set of private supervisory transformations and valuation 
assumptions. SAFE applies the asset liability classification and assumption scheme from the 
Federal Reserve’s private asset liability supervisory model (FRB IRR and Securities Focus 
Model). While the original data is all public-domain, call-report financial data, the classification, 
aggregation, and maturity assumption scheme is unique to the FRB Focus model. The following 
four maturity bands are used for both assets and liabilities: 0–3 months, 3–12 months, 1–3 years, 
and more than 3 years. Available funding liquidity for each maturity band is tracked through two 
sets of data: components of “total large and small time deposits,” and components of “other 
borrowed money (including FHLB advances).” Available asset liquidity for each maturity band 
is tracked through four sets of data: components of “first-lien 1–4 family mortgages loans and 
pass-throughs,” components of “CMOs and mortgage derivatives,” “all other loans,” and “all 
other securities.” 
The liquidity index is computed for three time horizons: immediate fire sale, 3-month 
forward sale, and 1-year forward sale, following Pierce (1966), as 
      	∑                 ⁄    
    ]  (5) 
Valuations for the asset and liability classes are based on a private supervisory set of liquidity 
haircuts developed separately as part of this study. The liquidity haircut scheme was based on the 
published supervisory haircuts used for the SCAP exercise and were supplemented as required 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
component of risk expectations may be expanded and improved. 72 
 
by public standardized sources, such as Moody's Investors Service (2001, 2002) and IOSCO 
(2002).
e, f 
Risk-based liquidity amplification is incorporated for the three time horizons, extending the 
methodology proposed by Krishnamurthy (2010), who shows that in both crisis and non-crisis 
conditions, the price of an asset Ps at date s is a function of three factors: the long-term 
fundamental value of the asset  , the time-dependent liquidity discount      , and the 
counterparty uncertainty function  .	In normally functioning markets, asset price may be 
modeled as 
         	       ∗      (6) 
while in crisis-shocked markets, uncertainty gets magnified as  
         	       ∗   (7) 
We implement the model as follows: 
1)  Normal uncertainty   is quantified as a credit-rating-equivalent, long-term (through-the-
cycle) default probability 
2)  Stress-condition un  rtainty   is quantified as a point-in-time expected default probability, 
using the Merton model’s expected default frequenc 	(Moody’s KMV EDF) 
3)  Shock-condition unc  tainty  	in extreme stress is the quantified maximum value of stress-
condition uncertainty at a peer institution 
4)  The liquid  y index	 s compu    for the three time horizo   (immediate fire sale, 3-month 
forward sale, and 1-year forward sale), quantifying an	 mmediate fire sale as a shock 
condition, a 3-  nth forward sale as a stress condition, and a 1-year forward sale as a normal 
condition. 
                                                            
e Matz  (2007). 73 
 
B.5. Construction of structural variables 
The impact of a systemic institution on macroeconomic markets is conditional on various 
structural factors. In this paper, we consider how structural relationships affect macroeconomic 
conditions by examining three types of structural indicators: measures of connectivity, measures 
of market concentration, and measures of market contagion through leverage. 
B.5.1. Connectivity 
Connectivity describes the interconnectedness and interdependence of systemic firms. A 
connectivity measure is designed to capture an aspect of structural fragility by measuring the 
interconnectedness and marginal impact of individual institutions on the aggregate financial 
system. To identify connectivity, we employ Adrian and Brunnermeier’s conditional value-at-
risk (CoVaR) technique, estimated using quantile regressions. CoVaR measures the value at risk
g 
of one financial portfolio conditional on the distress of another financial portfolio.
h In particular, 
we are interested in the extent to which poor stock-market returns are correlated with weak 
market returns for our quarterly systemic institutions. We determine the relationship by 
computing the 1 percent and 5 percent CoVaR and subtracting the 1 percent and 5 percent value 
at risk of the stock market for each institution and aggregating through simple summation. 
Mathematically, we can express our connectivity indicator as  
  ∑       
 |          
   
      (8) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
f Raffis  (2007). 
g VaR
i is defined mathematically as Pr            
      , where R
i is the dollar return of portfolio i 
and     
  is the unconditional q
th percentile of portfolio i’s historical dollar returns. 
h CoVaR
i|j is defined mathematically as Pr                
 |             
      ,  where R
i is the dollar 
return of portfolio i,     
 is the q
th percentile of portfolio j’s historical dollar returns, and       
 | is 
the q
th percentile of portfolio i’s historical dollar returns, conditional on portfolio j’s returns being 
equal to its q
th percentile historical dollar returns. 74 
 
where i is a broad-based stock market portfolio and j refers to each of our quarterly systemic 
institutions. We also compute a percentage based on a connectivity measure by dividing each 
difference in the summation above by the corresponding VaR in order to control for sharp 
differences in each institution’s market capitalization. 
B.5.2. Concentration 
Concentration describes the diversification of financial institutions—or its lack. Highly 
concentrated systemic firms create pockets that are highly susceptible to shocks through the 
concentration channels. Therefore, concentration indicators are designed to capture an aspect of 
structural fragility resulting from concentrations in the exposure profile both on and off balance 
sheets. Concentration in these various exposures is measured through the market share for 
institutions and the aggregate Herfindahl index measured for the capital, currency, and risk-
transfer markets. Separate market share and Herfindahl-like measures are obtained in each of 
these markets. 
An institution’s concentration in a particular market, expressed through the corresponding 
market share, is a useful explanatory indicator of structural fragility, since it measures the 
relative position of significant institutions in the financial system. Similarly, aggregate 
concentration, expressed through a form of the Herfindahl index, is a useful explanatory 
indicator of structural fragility, since it measures the relative position of large enterprises in the 
economy. The rationale for including concentration as an indicator of structural fragility is that, 
other things being equal, higher levels of market concentration are increasingly less efficient in 
absorbing and diversifying the impact of small shocks on expectations. Thus, a higher 
concentration indicates increased susceptibility to stress as the result of expectation shocks. 75 
 
We measure market concentration by computing modified Herfindahl indexes for capital 
(equity and credit); currency (FX and interbank); and risk transfer (securitizations, credit 
derivatives, and interest-rate derivatives) markets. To compute the modified Herfindahls, we first 
calculate market shares for each of our five systemic institutions, then aggregate the market 
shares as follows: 
                 ∑   
   
         5   
  ∑   
 
   
       
 
  (9) 
where Sj is the market share of firm j in market m and N is the number of bank holding 
companies. For markets where total size is unavailable, we calculate market shares as 




Appendix C. Data sources and variable expectations 
Table 15 
Explanatory Variables Data Sources. 
INDICATOR DATA  SOURCE  VARIABLE  START  DATE 
RETURN VARIABLES         
Capital Markets - Equity  Corporate value of equity at market value  CRSP  RET_1.1cpi  3/31/1980* 
  Residential Real Estate - National Price Index  S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices    3/31/1987 
Capital Markets - Credit  Call report loan portfolios  FRS - FDR  RET_2cpi  9/30/1990
† 
  Residential Real Estate - National Price Index  S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices    3/31/1987 
Capital Markets - Commercial Property  Call Report Commercial property portfolios (Construction, Non-farm 
non-residential, Multifamily) 
FRS - FDR  RET_4ta  9/30/1990
† 
  Commercial Real Estate - National Price Index  MIT Transactions-Based Index    3/31/1984 
Currency Markets – International 
Exposures 
Bank Constructed Interbank Derivative Exposure  FRS - FDR  RET_5.2ta  3/31/1995 




Risk Transfer Markets - Interest Rate 
Derivatives 
Bank Constructed IR Derivatives Exposure  FRS - FDR  RET_9ta  3/31/1995
† 
RISK EXPECTATIONS          
IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function  Equity less goodwill   FRS - FDR  RSK_2  6/30/1986 
  Interest Rate Risk Capital - through-the-cycle function  ℗ Calculated  RSK_2.1 6/30/1986 
IRR Indicators - point-in-time/stress 
function 
Interest Rate Risk Capital - stress function  ℗ Calculated  RSK_4 6/30/1997 
IRR Indicators - extreme stress/crisis 
function 
Change in economic value of equity  ℗ FRS - IRR FOCUS  RSK_6 6/30/1997
†Δ 
Credit Risk Indicators - through the cycle 
function 
Book Value: 12 call report loan portfolios - reported ALLL  FRS - FDR  RSK_7.1  12/31/1976 
  Credit Capital - through the cycle function  ℗ Calculated   9/31/1991* 
Credit Risk Indicators - extreme 
stress/crisis function 
Economic Value : 12 call report loan portfolios - 99.5 percent 
BankCaR 
℗ FRS - BankCaR Model  RSK_9 9/31/1991* 
Solvency - through the cycle function  Solvency - normal value  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_14 9/31/1991* 
  Tier 1 Capital  FRS - FDR    9/31/1991* 
Solvency - point-in-time/stress function  Solvency - stress value  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_15 9/31/1991* 
Solvency - extreme stress/crisis function   Solvency - extreme value  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_16 9/31/1991* 
IRR stress distance function  Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-systemic stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_F 9/31/1991* 
IRR stress distance function  Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_G 9/31/1991* 
Credit Risk stress distance function  Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_H 9/31/1991* 
Credit Risk stress distance function  Credit Risk - normal distance-to-systemic stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_I 9/31/1991* 
Credit Risk stress distance function  Credit Risk - normal distance-to-stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_K 9/31/1991* 
Solvency stress distance function  Solvency - stress distance-to-systemic stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_L 9/31/1991* 
Solvency stress distance function  Solvency - normal distance-to-systemic stress  ℗ Internal Model  RSK_M 9/31/1991* 
LIQUIDITY EXPECTATIONS         
AL Gap Indicators - '0 to 3 months' 
maturity band 
AL Gap Indicators - '0 to 3 months' maturity band  ℗ Calculated 
℗ IRR FOCUS specification 
LIQ_1 6/30/1997
†Δ 
AL Gap Indicators - '3 to 12 months' 
maturity band 
AL Gap Indicators |3 to 12 Months  ℗ Calculated 
℗ IRR FOCUS specification 
LIQ_2 6/30/1997
†Δ 
AL Gap Indicators - 'greater than 3 years' 
maturity band 
AL Gap Indicators |'greater than 3 years' maturity band  ℗ Calculated  LIQ_4 6/30/1997
†Δ 
Liquidity Index Indicators - 1-year forward 
sale 
Liquidity Index Indicators – 1-year forward sale  ℗ Internal Model  LIQ_5 9/31/1991* 
Liquidity Index Indicators - 3-month 
forward sale 
Liquidity Index Indicators - 3-month forward sale  ℗ Internal Model  LIQ_6 9/31/1991* 
Liquidity Index Indicators - immediate fire 
sale 
Liquidity Index Indicators - immediate fire sale  ℗ Internal Model  LIQ_7 9/31/1991* 
STRUCTURE        





Concentration Indicators - Capital Markets 
(Equity)  Concentration Indicators - Capital Markets (Equity)  ℗ Calculated 
FRS - Flow of Funds  STR_2 9/31/1991* 
Concentration Indicators - Currency 
Markets (FX)  Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (FX)  ℗ Calculated 
FRS - Flow of Funds 
STR_4 
STR_4.1  9/31/1991* 
Concentration Indicators - Currency 
Markets (Interbank)  Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets (Interbank)  ℗ Calculated 
FRS - Flow of Funds  STR_5 9/31/1991* 
Concentration Indicators - Risk Transfer 
Markets (Interest Rate Derivatives) 
Concentration Indicators - Risk Transfer Markets (Interest Rate 
Derivatives) 
℗ Calculated 
FRS - Flow of Funds  STR_8 9/31/1991* 
Leverage Indicators - normal  Leverage Indicators - normal  FRS - FDR  STR_9  6/30/1986 
 
Note: ℗ denotes private supervisory data components. * indicates start date set by data request.† 
denotes partial availability in of earlier data. Δ indicates gap in component data. 77 
 
Table 16 
Return variables: definitions, expectations, and Granger causality. 
VARIABLE  SERIES  EXPOSURE  GRANGER LAG  THEORETICAL EXPECTATION 
RET_1.1cpi           Capital Markets - Bonds (total-assets 
based) 
–  For an individual firm, a greater market capitalization provides an additional market equity buffer against potential losses, but also 
increases the downside risk. A larger RET_1.1cpi describes a larger difference between long-term return expectations and CPI 
and reflects greater downside risk to equity, positively related to the systemic financial stress. 
RET_2cpi       _  	 Capital Markets - Bonds (total-assets 
based) 
†: 11, 12  For an individual firm, a larger loan portfolio provides a buffer against potential credit losses, but also increases the downside risk. 
Here we use time series of Z-scores of aggregate of loan portfolios deflated by CPI. A larger value describes a larger difference 
between long-term return expectations and CPI and reflects greater downside risk in the credit markets.  
RET_4ta          
    Capital Markets - Commercial 
Property (total assets-based) 
–  For an individual institution, an increasing commercial property indicator reflects a larger credit risk exposure in the commercial 
property asset class, but may also reflect an underlying organic growth in assets. The aggregated commercial property portfolios 
are deflated by total assets, the measure describes a natural hedge against systemic stress.  RET_4ta         
    Capital Markets - Commercial 
Property (total assets-based) 
– 
RET_5.2ta          
    Interbank Derivative Exposure  ††: 11 
†: 10, 12 
The large and standardized derivative markets involve a large number of participants, and although a firm level, an unwise, ill-
informed or plainly speculative position can lead to an individual firm loss, the market overall is well diversified and well insulated 
from overall collapse, since the market participants losses and gains are balanced out. In the event that a major dealer or user of 
interbank derivates collapsed, the interbank derivatives markets are structured to self-resolve in an orderly fashion. Thus, a rise in 
a long-term real-time mean of the interbank derivative exposure should be negatively related to the systemic financial stress. 
RET_6cpi         _ 
    Currency Markets - Interbank 
Exposures (price-based) 
††: 2  Of the two available series, the CPI-based series reflects growth in interbank markets relative to inflationary expectations and 
captures greater aggregate liquidity and economic optimism reflected in the interbank markets, thus negatively related to systemic 
financial stress. On the other hand, the total-assets based series of aggregate interbank exposures, reflects the growth interbank 
concentration relative to aggregate assets, and thus, capture the structural aspect of interbank markets that is positively related 
systemic financial stress.
j 
RET_6ta             Currency Markets - Interbank 
Exposures (TA-based) 
††: 2, 4 
†: 5 
RET_9ta          
    Risk Transfer Markets - Interest Rate 
Derivatives 
††: 11, 12 
†: 8, 10 
We argue that interest rate risk derivative market has an established defensive function. A rise in a long-term real-time 
(accumulated) mean of the interest-rate risk derivative exposure should be negatively related to the systemic financial stress. 
j  See Blåvarg and Nimander (2002), Rajan (1996), Furfine (2003), and Degryse and Nguyen (2004).
 
Table 17 
Liquidity Variables: definitions, expectations, and Granger causality. 
VARIABLE  SERIES  EXPOSURE  GRANGER LAG  THEORETICAL EXPECTATION 
LIQ_1    _  03 	 AL Gap Indicators - '0 to 3 months' 
maturity band 
†: 3, 4  Asset Liability mismatch describes a simple gap difference between assets and liabilities. A larger mismatch indicates a larger 
imbalance in re-pricing and maturity and reflects a larger interest rate risk exposure. 
LIQ_2    _  312 	 AL Gap Indicators - '3 to 12 months' 
maturity band 
†: 4 
LIQ_4    _   3   AL Gap Indicators - 'greater than 3 
years' maturity band 
– 
LIQ_5    _  _  
    Liquidity Index Indicators - 1 year 
forward sale 
†: 8, 9, 10  A larger value of the Liquidity Index is associated with a more liquid and therefore less risky conditions. Hence, a rise in a long-
term real-time(accumulated) mean of this index should be negatively related to the systemic financial stress. 
LIQ_6    _  _  
    Liquidity Index Indicators - 3-month 
forward sale 
– 
LIQ_7    _  _  




Note: Plus sign indicates positive expectation. Minus sign indicates negative expectation. †† indicates Granger causality with 90 
percent or better confidence. † indicates Granger causality with 79 percent or better confidence.   78 
 
Table 18 
Risk variables: definitions, expectations, and Granger causality. 
VARIABLE  SERIES  EXPOSURE  GRANGER LAG  THEORETICAL EXPECTATION 
RSK_2        
    IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function  ††: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12 
†: 8, 10, 11 
For an individual institution, this indicator is constructed as the institution’s book value equity less goodwill. A rise in the 
aggregate series indicates more capacity the institution has to withstand losses and should be negatively related to the 
systemic financial stress.  RSK_2         
    IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function  ††: 3, 4, 5, 12 
†: 7, 8, 10, 11 
RSK_2.1       _     IRR Indicators - through-the-cycle function  ††: 2, 4, 7, 8 
†: 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 
For an individual institution, this indicator is constructed as the institution’s book value equity less goodwill inflated by the 
supervisory probability of default (RSK_2.1) and downgrade (RSK_4). The measure proxies an economic capital view of 
interest rate capital that would be required through the cycle (RSK_2.1) and under stress (RSK_4). The larger the value, the 
more is the long-term pressure on the institution and higher the potential for default induced by interest-rate risk capital 
needs. 
RSK_4       _     IRR Indicators - point-in-time/stress function  ††: 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
†: 4, 5, 12 
RSK_6        _  
    IRR Indicators - extreme stress/crisis 
function 
††: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7  This series describes aggregate economic value of the balance sheet evaluated under extreme stress. The larger the value, 
the better is the residual capacity to counteract stress and losses. Therefore, a rise in a long-term real-time (accumulated) 
mean of this series should be negatively related to the systemic financial stress. 
RSK_7.1       _  
    Credit Risk Indicators - through the cycle 
function 
††: 2, 3, 4, 5  For an individual institution, this series describes through-the-cycle credit capital, quantified as average positive ALLL for 
past 3 years. A rise in the reserves indicates greater capacity to withstand losses, therefore, a rise in a long-term real-time 
(accumulated) mean of this series should be negatively related to the systemic financial stress.  RSK_7.1        _  
    Credit Risk Indicators - through the cycle 
function 
†: 3, 4, 5, 6 
RSK_8a      	 Credit Risk Indicators - point-in-time/stress 
function 
††: 9 
†: 7, 8, 10 
This series measures an aggregated Z-Score for the Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF). A rise in the series 
indicates greater likelihood of systemic default. Thus, a rise in a long-term real-time (accumulated) mean of this series 
should be positively related to the systemic financial stress. 
RSK_9     _  
  	 Economic Value : 12 call report loan 
portfolios - 99.5 percent BankCaR 
†: 2, 3, 9  For an individual institution, this indicator measures residual economic value of the loan portfolio evaluated at extreme 
stress (proxied by 99.5 percent BankCaR). Rise in the series indicates greater residual capacity to withstand extreme stress 
and lesser potential for systemic stress. 
RSK_14      _  
    Solvency - through the cycle function  ††: 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 
†: 7, 9, 10, 11 
Solvency at each point in time is measured as the difference between available financial resources and required internal 
capital. The series measures the safety buffer helping to alleviate potential losses and stress. A rise in the solvency series 
indicates more available capacity to handle stress and losses and should be negatively related to the systemic financial 
stress. 
RSK_15      _  
    Solvency - point-in-time/stress function  ††: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 
†: 9 
RSK_16      _  
  	 Solvency - extreme stress/crisis function  †: 8, 9 
RSK_F    _    
    Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-
systemic stress 
††: 2, 4 
†: 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
The series measures the residual value between crisis and normal valuation of the company’s balance sheet. The less the 
value, the greater the potential for systemic stress. 
RSK_G    _       Interest Rate Risk - normal distance-to-
stress 
††: 2, 4 
†: 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
The series measures the incremental growth in internally required interest-rate risk capital as the institutional balance 
sheets transition from normal to stress valuations. The less the value, the smaller is the incremental capital required and the 
less is the potential for systemic stress. 
RSK_H    _    
    Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic 
stress 
††: 2, 3 
†: 4 
The series measures the difference between internally required credit capital at extreme value and internally required credit 
capital at stress value. As the distance increases at a particular point in time, the potential for systemic stress decreases. 
RSK_H     _    
    Credit Risk - stress distance-to-systemic 
stress 
†: 3, 5 
RSK_I    _    
    Credit Risk - normal distance-to-systemic 
stress 
†: 2, 3, 4, 8, 9  The series measures the difference between internally required credit capital at extreme value (RSK_I) or stress value 
(RSK_K) and internally required credit capital at normal-through-the-cycle value. As the distance increases at a particular 
point in time, the potential for systemic stress decreases.  RSK_K    _    
    Credit Risk - normal distance-to-stress  – 
RSK_L     _    
    Solvency - stress distance-to-systemic 
stress 
††: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 
†: 6, 9 
The time series of solvency stress distance (RSK_L) or normal distance (RSK_M) to systemic tress measures the potential 
deficit in the solvency buffer at each point in time. By construction, this distance series is always negative, but may 
approach zero. Thus, the larger is this deficit, the closer it is to zero, the less is the potential for systemic stress.  RSK_M     _    
    Solvency - normal distance-to-systemic 
stress 
††: 3, 4, 5, 8 
†: 6 
Note: Plus sign indicates positive expectation. Minus sign indicates negative expectation. †† indicates Granger causality with 90 




Structure variables: definitions, expectations, and Granger causality. 
VARIABLE  SERIES  EXPOSURE  GRANGER LAG  THEORETICAL EXPECTATION 
STR_1.2    _ 5    	 Connectivity Indicators – CoVaR at 5 percent †: 5  For an individual institution, the conditional value at risk indicates the relative contribution of the institution to the aggregate 
5 percent quantile Value at Risk. A rise in the aggregated series corresponds to greater contribution to systemic risk. 
STR_1.3    _ 1    	 Connectivity Indicators – Delta CoVaR at 1 
percent 
–  For an individual institution, the marginal value at risk indicates the difference in the institution’s x percent quantile CoVaR 
and the aggregate x percent quantile Value at Risk. A rise in the series corresponds to greater contribution to systemic risk. 
STR_1.4    _ 5    	 Connectivity Indicators – Delta CoVaR at 5 
percent 
– 
STR_2    _      Concentration Indicators - Capital Markets 
(Equity) 
–  This series measures the concentration time series of market capitalization of top five US BHCs relative to the total US 
equity market from the Flow of Funds. The rise in the series shows increasing market dominance of smaller number of firms 
and reflects a growing potential for market disruption due to failure of the individual participants. 
STR_4    _      Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets 
(FX) 
††: 2, 3, 4 
†: 5, 8 
This series measures the concentration time series of FX exposures of top five US BHCs relative to the total FX market 
from the Flow of Funds. The rise in the series shows increasing market dominance of smaller number of firms and reflects a 
growing potential for market disruption due to failure of the individual participants. 
STR_4.1    _       Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets 
(FX) 
††: 6 
†: 2, 4, 7 
STR_5    _      Concentration Indicators - Currency Markets 
(Interbank) 
††: 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 
†: 5, 7 
This series measures concentration in currency interbank markets assuming this market can be represented by the top 
twenty bank holding companies. Although this is a relative measure of market concentration as captured by the BHCs, rise 
in the concentration indicator shows increasing market dominance of smaller number of firms and reflects a growing 
potential for market disruption due to failure of the individual participants  
STR_8    _       Concentration Indicators - Risk Transfer 
Markets (Interest Rate Derivatives) 
–  This series measures the concentration time series in risk transfer markets for interest rate derivatives. The rise in the 
series shows increasing market dominance of smaller number of firms and reflects a growing potential for market disruption 
due to failure of the individual participants. 
STR_9    _       Contagion (normal leverage)  ††: 2, 3, 4, 12 
†: 5 
Normal leverage is measured as ratio of debt to equity. Use of leverage allows financial institutions to increase potential 
gains on its inherent equity position. Since increases in debt carries a variety of risks, typically credit, market, and interest 
rate risk, increased leverage is a double-edged magnifier of returns, increasing both potential gains and potential losses. 
The rise in the normal leverage describes higher level of “risky” debt relative to “safer” equity. 
Note: Plus sign indicates positive expectation. Minus sign indicates negative expectation. †† indicates Granger causality with 90 
percent or better confidence. † indicates Granger causality with 79 percent or better confidence. 
 